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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that in 1975 living individuals contributed $21.4 
billion to philanthropic causes [l, p. 6]. In the same period disposable 
personal income was $1076.8 billion so that giving as a percentage of 
disposable personal income was 1.99 [1, p. 6]. This estimate of individ­
ual contributions probably understates the true level of giving or 
voluntary transfer since it is based upon 1RS tax data which takes into 
account only itemized deductions due to contributions and an estimate of 
the contributions of nonitemizers. It does not take into account trans­
fers to individuals or transfers to organizations that do not hold a tax 
deductible status, nor does it take into account the value of the time 
that individuals donate to various causes. It is estimated that 
Americans gave more than five-and-a-half billion hours of volunteer time 
to various charitable causes and organizations during 1975. The value 
of this time is estimated to be worth more than $25 billion [l, p. 8]. 
Americans are a charitable people, both in terms of the money and goods 
which they annually donate to various causes and in terms of the time 
which they voluntarily give to these same and other causes. 
That portion of economic theory known as the theory of the consumer 
usually assumes that the consumer is selfish in that his utility function 
depends only upon the goods and services that he himself consumes. It is 
assumed that the consumer always wants more of a good or service rather 
than less of it. This implies that the consumer is never sated with 
what he has and that he will never give away the goods that he possesses 
nor his purchasing power (money) unless he receives something in return 
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on which he places a value equal to or greater than the value of the 
item which he gave away. If we assume that gifts are one-way transfers, 
i.e., something is given but nothing is received, then a rational con­
sumer would not give away items dear to him. The fact that consumers 
apparently voluntarily give away some two percent of their annual income 
seems to contradict a general assumption about consumer behavior. 
This dissertation will concern itself with a study of why consumers 
voluntarily transfer purchasing power or ownership of goods and services 
to other individuals, groups, and organizations. The redistribution of 
resources may be effected in several ways. Perhaps the most common is 
through a change in relative prices. If an economic system were ini­
tially in equilibrium and relative prices changed, then resources would 
tend to flow into those areas that had experienced relative price in­
creases and out of those areas that had experienced relative price 
decreases. This redistribution of resources is, of course, brought about 
by the profit motive. 
Another method of redistributing resources is through the tax-
transfer mechanism available to governmental units. Governmental units 
reduce the resource holdings of consumers and producers througji taxation 
and then use these acquired resources either to purchase goods and 
services or to make transfers among producers and consumers under that 
governmental unit's jurisdiction. If the governmental unit uses the 
resources to purchase goods and services, the bundle of commodities that 
it purchases will, in general, differ from the bundle that the taxed 
consumers and producers would have purchased. Thus, resources will flow 
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to the producers of the commodity bundle purchased by the governmental 
unit and away from the producers of the commodity bundle that the taxed 
consumers and producers would have purchased. 
A third method of redistribution is through voluntary transfers by 
individuals. Resources are transferred from those who make the transfer 
to those who receive the transfer. We are concerned with the last of 
these three methods of redistributing resources, with what ^iisgrave has 
labeled secondary redistribution and what Boulding has denoted private 
grants [5, p. 6; 38, p. 991]. Redistribution through the public sector 
has been labeled primary redistribution by Musgrave and public grants 
by Boulding [5, p. 6; 38, p. 991]. 
tfy interest in the area of voluntary transfers stems from Boulding's 
work on "grants economics" [5] fortified by the ever increasing volume 
of literature that concerns itself with Pareto optimal redistribution.^ 
Boulding has argued that an economic theory based solely upon the concept 
of exchange paints an incomplete picture of the state of the world. A 
more complete picture would be presented if we included a concept of 
grants within the economic framework. Boulding defines grants as one­
way transfers of economic goods which may be motivated by either inte­
grative (loving) relationships and the integrative system or threats and 
the threat system. We shall generally assume that transfers are motivated 
by the integrative system, for if the threat system were in force the 
voluntary nature of transfers would be lost or, at least, impaired. 
^For a recent article with an extensive bibliography on Pareto 
optimal redistribution see Johnston [30]. 
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Boulding lists several areas where a theory of grants could improve 
economic theory in general. The most obvious of these areas is in the 
field of philanthropy and, by extension, governmental welfare programs. 
He states that "Economics has a theory of the firm, as it exists in an 
exchange economy; it has no theory of a foundation, and no very good 
theory of a government as an economic organization, partly because of 
its neglect of the grants concept" [5, p. 5]. Another area that could 
be improved by a theory of grants is the theory of organizations. 
Internal transfers of resources are of great importance to the function­
ing of organizations of all sizes, from the family up to and including 
the socialist state. Finally he points out that the grants concept 
could be used in analyzing the socialist controversy and other political 
controversies. At the heart of the socialist controversy is the question 
of what proportion of the activities of society should be organized by 
exchange and what proportion by grants. Our interest lies mostly in the 
first of these possible uses of the grants concept. 
The literature that concerns itself with redistribution from a 
Pareto efficient viewpoint is a fairly recent development. In the late 
I960's and early 1970's several authors independently discovered that the 
Pareto criteria could be effectively used in the study of redistribution 
[2; 19; 22; 34; 41; 48]. The Pareto criterion can be stated as follows. 
If we are given two states of nature, state A and state B, and if society 
is originally in state A, then a move from state A to state B is a Pareto 
better move if 1) at least one person feels himself to be better off in 
state B than in state A and 2) no other person feels himself to be worse 
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off in state B compared with state A. The great weakness of the Pareto 
criterion is that it can not tell us which state is preferred if in 
moving from one state to another some people are made worse off and some 
people are made better off. In order to distinguish a preferred state 
in this instance it would be necessary to compare utility gains and 
losses for the entire societal population. If the sum of the utility 
gains were greater than the sum of the utility losses, then the new state 
would be the preferred state. This type of analysis implies that we 
could objectively make interpersonal utility comparisons. In his famous 
essay. Robbing [42] argued that such interpersonal utility comparisons 
could not be made objectively. Indeed, his essay marked the end of the 
"old" welfare economics which had assumed that such interpersonal utility 
comparisons could be made. 
It was long thought that the inability of the Pareto criterion to 
choose a preferred state when there were some gainers and some losers 
meant that it was unable to make any distributional judgments whatsoever. 
This distributional hypothesis was based, however, upon the assumption 
that the utility functions of all consumers were independent. Once we 
allow utility functions to become interdependent, then the possibility of 
Pareto relevant redistribution occurs. Most generally the interdepen­
dence takes the form of consumption externalities whereby a subset of 
the commodity bundle consumed by one individual will affect the utility 
level of some other individual [2; 13; 4l]. Occasionally the inter­
dependence will be a utility externality where the utility level of one 
individual will enter as an argument in the utility function of another 
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individual [22; 49]. Clearly the most general interdependent utility 
function will incorporate both the consumption externality and the 
utility externality [12; 43]. 
Utility interdependence or interdependence of preferences is not a 
new concept, but until the recent surge of interest in how it relates to 
redistribution, this interdependence concerned itself with how arguments 
in the utility function of one individual mi^t affect the tastes of 
another individual as they relate to his own (the second individual's) 
consumption of goods and services [15; 29; 32; 37]. Other than this 
effect on tastes, interdependence of preferences was seen as a thorny 
problem by the theorist and was assumed away whenever possible. The 
chief reason for neglecting interdependence of preferences is that this 
interdependence can lead to situations where not every competitive 
equilibrium will be Pareto efficient [2, p. 385; 11, p. 134]. When 
utility interdependence is present Pareto efficiency may require the 
price of goods be different for different consumers. 
The two person case for redistribution when interdependence of 
preferences is present is reasonably straightforward, but due to the 
free rider problem^ and the pricing problem discussed above the analysis 
does not extend easily to the many person case. Some economists who have 
studied this problem recommend that redistribution be made a collecti­
vized good and that this collectivization be achieved through the public 
or political market [22, p. 543; 38, p. 991; 48, p. 335; 49, p. 629]. 
^The free rider problem occurs when an individual receives benefits 
from consuming a good or service but does not pay his share of the cost 
of providing the good or service. 
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This extension into the political market raises many problems for 
the economist, however. 
One problem is very familiar to economists and has to do with 
the controversy over whether taxes should be based on the benefit 
principle or the ability-to-pay principle. For Pareto efficient 
redistribution it is necessary that taxes be levied on the basis 
of the benefit that taxpayers receive from such redistribution. 
The benefit principle is based on the fact that individuals 
receive some marginal benefit from the output of a given amount of 
public goods (and here we are including redistribution as a public 
good). If the government could ascertain the marginal benefits 
accruing to each consumer it would be able to assign and collect 
taxes on the basis of these true marginal benefits. With perfect 
knowledge the government could adjust the output of public goods in 
such a way that the taxes which were collected on the basis of the 
marginal benefits to taxpayers were just sufficient to cover the 
costs of that particular bundle of public goods. Thus, in theory, 
the moving of redistribution from the private sector to the public 
sector could solve the free rider problem because theoretically 
each person could be taxed according to the marginal benefits he 
received from redistribution. In reality taxpayers will not 
reveal their true preferences and the govermment has no practical 
way of divining what their true preferences are. Thus we move from 
the free rider problem of the private sector to the preference 
revelation problem of the public sector. 
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One could argue that even with the preference revelation 
problem the collectivization of redistribution would be more 
efficient that leaving it in the private sector since there would 
be fewer free riders in the public sector and total redistribution 
would be closer to the optimum. If we assumed taxes were based on 
the ability-to-pay principle then some individuals would be taxed 
according to their marginal benefit from redistribution, some 
would be undertaxed, and some would be overtaxed, but total monies 
collected for redistribution should increase. Even if the collective 
redistribution of transfers were made in accordance with taxpayers* 
private preferences we still could not be certain that collective 
redistribution would be Pareto better than purely voluntary redis­
tribution. When all interdependencies are benevolent, the 
voluntary movement from the pre-transfer distribution to the post-
transfer distribution must be a Pareto better move even if the 
Pareto efficient locus^ is not reached. In the tax-transfer case, 
the movement from the original, pre-tax distribution to the final, 
post-transfer distribution is not necessarily a Pareto better move. 
We can assume that the individuals who are undertaxed and properly 
taxed will be better off, especially if those who are undertaxed 
have the opportunity to make nontax transfers. Those who are 
distribution is on the Pareto efficient locus if it is 
impossible to redistribute any good without making some person worse 
off. 
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overtaxed will not necessarily be better off and might be worse 
off under the post-transfer distribution than they are under the pre­
tax distribution. If they are worse off, then we are back to the major 
weakness of the Pareto criterion. It can not tell us whether the pre­
tax or post-transfer distribution is preferred if some members of society 
are made better off by the move and some members are made worse off. 
Moving redistribution from the private sector to the public sector does 
not guarantee that the Pareto efficient locus will be reached or even 
that the final collective distribution will be preferred to the final 
voluntary distribution. 
There is an alternative to redistribution as presented above. 
Instead of redistributing resources through the public sector or by 
individual action in the private sector, a group of individuals may form 
within the private sector for the purpose of effecting such redistribu­
tion as the members of the group desire. These private sector groups 
will be called charities. The particular economics of charities have 
not been widely studied.^ We will discuss this particular group in 
Chapter III. 
Individuals are driven to join or contribute to charities or to 
make individual voluntary transfers by many different motives and objec­
tives. We will generally assume that the word "voluntary" means that the 
individual making a transfer is not coerced into making such transfer and 
that he does not receive any socially-imposed penalty if he does not make 
^Ireland and Johnson [27] is the only reference we have found that 
devotes itself to charities as we have defined them. 
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a transfer. Noncoercive social pressure is a gray area that we will 
discuss below. Some of the motives and objectives that cause individuals 
to make transfers are listed below. 
1. Individuals may have interdependent utility functions where the 
interdependency consists of consumption externalities, utility externali­
ties, or both. This motivation has been discussed briefly above and will 
be discussed in more detail in later chapters. 
2. Giving appears as an argument in the utility functions of 
individuals [5, p. 3; 26, p. 72; 27, p. 20; 28, p. 93; 35, p. 4; 
48, p. 327]. In this case the act of giving renders utility to the 
individual. This motive is sometimes called the Kantian motive 
[27, p. 20; 28, p. 93]. It is not clear that the giver of the transfer 
would necessarily receive more utility from making a larger transfer as 
opposed to a smaller one in this case. That is, with this motive there 
may be a region of diminishing marginal utility from transfers. The 
point at which the diminishing marginal utility occurs would probably 
depend upon the perceived importance of the "cause" toward which the 
transfer was directed. Also, in this case, the initiator of the transfer 
would probably not have any systematic method for determining the 
recipient of the transfer. Since the utility is received from the act 
of giving, the recipient would seem to be of secondary importance. 
3. The distribution of income or resources enters as an argument 
in individual utility functions [5, p. 8; 6, p. 14; 23, p. 65; 47, p. 1; 
48]. Presumably the desire for a particular income distribution will 
motivate the individual in question to make transfers in order to bring 
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about his desired distribution. The amount the individual can transfer 
is constrained by his initial income holdings and by the fact that his 
transfers will be limited to the point at which his loss in utility due 
to the reduction in his own income is just equal to his gain in utility 
from achieving a more desired distribution of income. 
4. The individual may have religious motives for making transfers 
[20, p. 13; 28, p. 92; 35, p. 4; 36, p. 15]. Historically, this is 
probably the most important motivating force behind personal transfers 
and, although this force is probably not as strong now as in years past, 
it is estimated that between forty and fifty percent of all charitable 
contributions in the United States flow through religious organizations 
[l, p. 7]. Religions influence an individual's tastes by stressing to 
him the importance of looking after his fellow man. The religious motiva­
tion is reinforced by the following motivations which will be explained 
more fully below: 1) the insurance motive--an individual will give to a 
religious organization with the hope that the organization would provide 
for him should his position deteriorate substantially; 2) the long run 
exchange motive—the individual is willing to forego personal consumption 
here on earth in order to insure himself a place in heaven, i.e., he is 
exchanging temporal wealth for spiritual wealth; and 3) the social pres­
sure motive—since the local units of religious organizations are usually 
organized as small number groups, the problems that arise in large number 
groups can be avoided. The free rider problem will not be as prevalent 
since group members can bring social pressure to bear upon those members 
who attempt to free ride. The fact that the individual has the option of 
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withdrawing from the religious group but does not do so would indicate 
that he is in basic agreement with the policies of the organization. 
Hence, he would be more likely to make voluntary donations to that 
organization with a minimal amount of social pressure than if the with­
drawal option were not present. 
5. The insurance motive can also cause the individual to make 
voluntary transfers. This motive has been presented in several forms: 
disaster relief [5, p. 4; 14]; revolution avoidance [26, p. 72; 35, 
p. 168; 36, p. 14; 48, p. 327]; maintenance of allegiances [36, p. 71]; 
the religious motive [28, p. 92]; and income stability [7, p. 44; 44, 
p. 166; 48, p. 327] among others. All of these motives have one common 
goal--to maintain a relatively constant utility level over the life 
cycle. Individuals will be willing to make transfers when their utility 
levels are reasonably high and when they have the knowledge or expecta­
tion that doing so will make them eligible to receive transfers when 
their utility falls to low levels and they think that there is a positive 
probability that their utility will fall to low levels. 
6. Many transactions thought to be one-way transfers may not be 
grants at all, but may be, in reality, intertemporal exchanges [5, p. 2; 
36, p. 14]. In this case grants take on the meaning of credit given or 
credit repaid. 
7. Some transfers may be motivated by social pressure [3, p. 166; 
24, p. 282; 26, p. 73; 28, p. 94]. If the individual received no utility 
or negative utility from making the transfer then we assume that he would 
not make the transfer even in the face of social pressure. This implies 
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that the potential transferor does not consider a cost to be attached to 
the social pressure. In reality, the individual will probably attach a 
cost to social pressure and, in this case, he will make the transfer if 
the cost of doing so is less than the cost of the social pressure. One 
might consider threats to be a kind of social pressure, but threats 
negate the voluntary aspect of transfers and we have stated that the 
type of transfer we wish to study is the voluntary type. 
8. Transfers may be seen as rewards for certain types of behavior 
on the part of the recipient [5, p. 3; 24, p. 284]. Managers who pass 
out bonuses to their employees and parents who base transfers to their 
children in whole or in part upon the children's behavior would fall 
into this category. 
9. Transfers may be given in order to reduce one's tax burden 
[16; 17; 35, p. 4]. Indeed, it has long been recognized that the 
progressive tax rate and the right of individuals to deduct some chari­
table contributions from their tax base combine to make the price of 
charitable contributions decline as the individual's inccme increases. 
Thus high income (wealthy) individuals have an incentive to transfer more 
money and goods to charitable organizations than low income (poor) 
individuals, not only because their income constraint is less binding, 
but also because the price of the contribution is lower for them. 
10. Transfers may be given to free the transferor from some nuisance 
presented by the recipient [46, p. 1265]. Giving a donation to a beggar 
on the street or to someone who knocks on one's door would be of this 
type of motivation if the sole reason for the transfer was to get rid of 
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the recipient or of some nuisance associated with him. In this particu­
lar case there is actually a two-way exchange taking place but since the 
gain to the donor (i.e., nuisance relief) cannot be observed the exchange 
is misclassified as a one-way transfer. Transfers made due to social 
pressure might be classified as nuisance relief transfers insofar as 
social pressure is a nuisance to the potential transferor. Also trans­
fers made because of threat or force applied to the transferor by the 
recipient would fall into this category if the force or threat were 
removed when the transfer was made. 
11. An individual may make a transfer, not out of any concern for 
the recipient, but with the knowledge that by making such a transfer he 
improves his own self-esteem and/or his level of prestige within his 
community [3, p. 166; 5, p. 3; 25, p. 73; 26, p. 454; 35, p. 4; 36, p. 1; 
46, p. 1264]. This is different from the Kantian motive (motive 2) in 
that it is not so much the act of giving that yields utility to the 
transferor as it is his knowledge that his transfers will increase his 
status within the community. 
12. The last motive to be mentioned is that individuals will make 
transfers in order to put the recipients in their debt [3, p. 166; 25, 
p. 454; 35, p. 4; 36, p. l]. Very often giving is a means of obtaining 
social credit whereas receiving a gift signifies accepting a social debt. 
If the transferor desires to control the recipient then the recipient's 
acceptance of the gift will indicate that he is willing to accept the 
conditions put forth by the transferor. 
The motivations and objectives presented above certainly do not 
include all the possible reasons that would cause an individual to make 
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transfers, but we feel that these are some of the major reasons. The 
many and varied motives and objectives that drive individuals to make 
voluntary transfers and the complex inter-relationships among these 
motives and objectives make it extremely difficult to develop a single 
methodology that will adequately explain voluntary consumer transfers. 
We feel that the interdependent utility function offers the most reason­
able and most promising approach to follow in developing a theory of 
consumer transfers. This is the approach we will follow. 
In the next chapter we will develop a two person model of 
eleemosynary behavior utilizing interdependent utility functions. We 
will compare the optimal solutions when only one individual experiences 
utility interdependence, and when both individuals experience utility 
interdependence. We will then show how these solutions differ from the 
solutions obtained when the analysis assumes independent utility func-
tions. 
In Chapter III we will attempt to generalize our model to the N-
person case. We will study the case where only one individual experi­
ences utility interdependence and some cases where many or all individuals 
have interdependent utility functions. In many instances it will be to 
the advantage of potential donors to form groups called charities in 
order to effect more efficient redistribution. We will study the condi­
tions necessary for the formation of charities and some of the problems 
that their existence entails. We will also have something more to say 
about the collectivization of redistribution through the public sector. 
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The final chapter. Chapter IV, will consist of a summary of results 
and the conclusions that can be drawn from the analyses presented in 
Chapters II and III. We will also indicate in Chapter IV what we feel 
are fruitful directions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II. THE TWO PERSON CASE 
In this chapter we will analyze eleemosynary behavior in a two 
person world. In order to effectively analyze this type of behavior 
we must make some changes in the commonly received theory of consumer 
choice. Specifically we will modify the consumer's utility function, 
which is assumed to be strictly private in the orthodox theory, so that 
it includes as arguments the consumption pattern of the other individual. 
This modification is necessary because the type of behavior we are 
studying is not private but is interpersonal by definition. In many 
instances individuals make decisions which take other individuals, or 
the actions of those other individuals, into account. An individual's 
decision to forego his own consumption in order to make a gift to another 
individual is clearly one such instance. So too is the case in which the 
consumption bundle of one individual is Influenced by the consumption 
bundles of other individuals. Thus, we feel that the theory of consumer 
choice can be generalized by the utilization of interdependent utility 
functions. 
In the first section of this chapter we develop some standard 
assumptions of consumer behavior. The second section develops a two 
person, two good model of exchange when both individuals have strictly 
private utility functions. We assume there are only two goods so that 
we may present our analysis in graphical as well as mathematical terms. 
In the third section we will develop a model of exchange when our 
individuals have interdependent utility functions. In the fourth and 
last section we apply the theory of interdependent utility functions to 
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analyze the eleemosynary behavior of one individual when the other 
suffers a disastrous event which reduces his holdings of consumable 
goods. 
Assumptions Concerning the Individual Consumer^ 
In this section some assumptions will be made about the individual 
consumer and his behavior will be analyzed given these assumptions. It 
is assumed that the individual acts as a rational consumer. That is, 
he will act so as to maximize his utility given his income constraint and 
any other constraints he may face and given the alternative bundles of 
of goods that are available to him. We assume that his consumption 
bundle contains a nonnegative amount of all goods produced in his 
society. Thus the commodity space facing the consumer is the nonnegative 
orthant of Euclidean n-space where n is the number of possible goods the 
consumer may select for his consumption bundle. 
We assume that the consumer has a cardinal utility function which 
can, in the two good case, be expressed as 
U = U(x^, xg), (2.1) 
where x^ and x^ are the quantities of goods and that the individual 
consumes and 'U' is a function that determines the amount of utility the 
individual receives from the consumption of x^ units of good X^ and Xg 
units of good X^. It is assumed that *U* is continuous and has continuous 
^The analysis of the two person two good exchange model follows the 
general model developed in many intermediate microeconomic texts. The 
reader is referred to [18, Part I] or [21, Chapter 2] for a more complete 
development. 
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first-order and second-order partial derivatives. We should note that 
*U' is defined over some specific period of time. While of unspecified 
length, this time period is assumed to be long enough that all the 
benefits from the consultation of a good accrue to the individual in the 
period in which the good was consumed. It is assumed to be short enougjh 
that the preferences of the individual may be considered constant during 
the period. 
* 
In general some given level of utility U=U can be obtained from 
many different combinations of and Xg. The first-order partial 
derivatives of U with respect to (i=l,2) are assumed to be greater 
than zero: 
> 0 ;  i  =  1 ,  2 .  ( 2 . 2 )  
This implies that the individual always receives more utility as he 
consumes more of (i«l,2). The second-order partial derivatives are 
assumed to be less than zero: 
< 0 ;  i  =  1 ,  2 .  ( 2 . 3 )  
This implies that as the individual consumes more of good X^ (i=l,2) he 
receives less incremental utility from each additional unit of X^ con­
sumed. 
If we take the total differential of equation 2.1 we get 
^ tx^ ^ 1 SÎÇ *^2• (2.4) 
In order for the consumer to maintain a constant level of utility, dU in 
equation 2.4 must equal zero. This implies 
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M. 
ôx 
= ^2- (2.5) 
ax^ 
Both the numerator and denominator of the right hand term are positive by 
equation 2.2. Therefore if the individual's consumption of X^ increases 
by one unit he must decrease his consumption of X- by units in 
2 ^2 
order to maintain the same level of utility. In order to maintain a 
constant level of utility, then, the consumer must compensate for his 
increased consumption of X^ by decreasing his consumption of X^. 
An indifference curve is defined as the locus of all possible com­
binations of the goods X^ and X^ which give rise to some constant level 
of utility, U*. In Figure 2.1 we measure X^ along the horizontal axis 
and Xg along the vertical axis. The curve I* shows all possible combina­
tions of goods Xj^ and X^ which give the consumer a utility level of U*. 
In other words, point (x^*, Xg*) gives rise to a utility level of U*, 
(U* = U(x^*, Xg*), as does point (x^°, Xg^), (U* = U(x^°, Xg^)). All 
points or bundles of goods above and to the right of I* will give the 
consumer a greater level of utility than any point (bundle) on I*. All 
points or bundles below and to the left of I* will give the consumer a 
lower level of utility. We assume that every point in the commodity 
space is on an indifference curve with each indifference curve indicating 
a different level of utility. The slope of the indifference curve at 
any point is 
22 
H 
axg 
dX ÔX 
' AU (2.6) 
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Figure 2.1. A simple indifference map 
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The slope of the indifference curve is called the consumer's marginal 
rate of substitution of for and indicates the rate at which the 
consumer would substitute X^ for X^ in order to maintain a constant 
level of utility. 
A collection of indifference curves is called an indifference map. 
In Figure 2.1, I* and I** are two of the infinite number of indifference 
curves on the individual's indifference map. Curve I** denotes a higher 
level of utility than curve I*. 
We will show that indifference curves cannot cross but first we need 
to make some assumptions concerning consumers' preferences. Let us 
define the commodity bundle (x^*, Xg*) to be A* and the bundle 
(xj^**, Xg**) to be A**. Completeness of a consumer's preferences dic­
tates that A* R A**, A** R A*, or both. If A* R A** and not A** R A* 
then A* P A**. In other words. A* R A** says that the consumer either 
prefers bundle A* to bundle A** or that he is indifferent between them. 
The same holds for A** R A* with the roles of A* and A** reversed. If 
both A* R A** and A** R A* hold at the same time, then the consumer is 
indifferent between the bundles A* and A**. In this case, both A* and 
A** would lie on the same indifference curve. If the consumer holds 
bundle A* as preferred or indifferent to bundle A** (A* R A**) but A** 
is not preferred or indifferent to A* (not A** R A*) then obviously the 
bundle A* must be strictly preferred to bundle A** (A* P A**) and A* 
would lie on a higher indifference curve than A**. 
We assume that a consumer's preferences are transitive. Let us 
define the commodity bundle (x^°, Xg^) to be A°. If A* R A** and 
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A** R A°, it necessarily follows that A* R A°. If either A* P A** 
and A** R A° or A* R A** and A** P A°, then A* P A°. 
We assume that a consumer's preferences are reflexive. That is, 
we assume that A* R A*. A bundle of goods is at least as preferred as 
itself. 
We assume that the consumption set the individual faces forms a 
convex set. That is, if A* and A** are both available to the consumer, 
then A° is also available to the consumer where A° = oA* + (l-a)A** 
with a e [0,1]. 
Lastly, consider any bundle A*. We assume that the set of bundles 
preferred or indifferent to A* is closed and that the set of bundles not 
preferred to A* is closed. This condition ensures that the 
preferences of the consumer are continuous. 
Given these conditions it can be shown that the consumer's indif­
ference curves cannot cross. Consider the points A*, A**, and A° in 
Figure 2.2. Each point on the indifference map corresponds to some 
specific level of utility. Point A* corresponds to a utility level of 
U*; point A** to U**; and point A° to U°. Since we have assumed that 
> 0 (i=l,2) (equation 2.2) and since the point A° has more of both 
and Xg than point A*, it must follow that U° > U*. Now since A* and 
A** lie on the same indifference curve, U* = U** (i.e. A* R A** and 
A** R A*). A** and A° also share a common indifference curve (A** R A° 
and A° R A**) so U** must equal U°. By our assumption of transitivity 
if A* R A** and A** R A° then A* R A°. If the consumer is indifferent 
between A* and A** and is also indifferent between A** and A°, then he 
A** 
A* 
0 
Figure 2.2. Intersecting Indifference curves 
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must be indifferent between A* and A°. This indicates that A* and A° 
lie on the same indifference curve (U* = U°). But here we have a contra­
diction for U* < U° as long as equation 2.2 holds. Since we will con­
tinue to assume that that equation holds, D* cannot equal U° and indif­
ference curves cannot cross. 
Given that the consumer has an indifference map which indicates 
the level of utility he receives from various bundles of goods, it is 
necessary to find some method which will determine that bundle of goods 
which gives the consumer the greatest level of utility. If there were 
no constraints on the amount of goods he could consume in a given time 
period (all goods had a zero price) and if the consumer were never sated 
by any bundle of goods, then there would be no limit to the amount of 
utility he could receive in a single period unless there were a constraint 
on the supply of all goods. 
Throu^out the rest of this section and in the next section it will 
be assumed that the consumer is not satiated by any bundle of goods. The 
assumption will also be made that the consumer faces a budget constraint 
equal to his income in each period. The level of consumption the consumer 
can undertake is limited by this budget constraint which is written as 
M = p^x^ + PgXg. (2.7) 
M is the individual's income and p^^ is the price of good (i=l,2). 
In general 
n 
Ms S p.x.. (2.8) 
i=l ^ ^  
We will assume that the consumer spends his entire income so that 
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M= S p.x,. (2.9) 
1=1 
The utility maximizing bundle of goods must satisfy both the 
utility function and the budget constraint. To find this utility maxi­
mizing bundle of goods we set up the problem of Lagrange: 
L = UCxj^jXj) +X(M - p^x^ - PgXg)' (2.10) 
Differentiating L with respect to X^, and X and setting the result­
ing partial derivatives equal to zero gives 
dx; = - tPi = 0' 
dX; = &%; - tPz = 0' <2.12) 
- V2 ° 0- (2-13) 
Letting 
M U . = ^ .  ( 2 . 1 4 )  
It is easily observable that 
MU p MU MU 
—— = — which implies . (2.15) 
^2 P2 Pi P2 
Thus the first-order conditions state that at the utility maximizing 
point the ratio of the consumer's marginal utilities (his marginal rate 
of substitution) must equal the ratio of the prices he faces. Further, 
utility maximization will occur at that point where the consumer spends 
all his income for that period. To insure that the first-order condi­
tions lead to a maximum, it is sufficient that the principal minors of 
the Hessian alternate in sign with the first sign being negative (i.e.. 
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the Hessian must be negative-definite). In our two good constrained 
maximization problem the Hessian is 
H = 
3x^3X2 
3x3X1 
3X2^ 
jtk. 
3X3X. 
3^L 
3X23X 
A 
3X^ '1 "^"2 
The required signs for the principal minors are 
Hil = afii_ 
3x^2 
< 0, 
H2I = 
3X^2 3X^3X2 
3x^3x2 3X. 
> 0; given |H^| < 0, 
(2.16) 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
(2.19) |Hg( = jH| < 0; given )H^| < 0 and (Hg] > 0. 
These second-order conditions insure that the indifference curves 
are convex from below. Thus the tangency between the consumer's budget 
constraint and an indifference curve (point A in Figure 2.3) will indi­
cate a utility maximum and not a utility minimum. At his utility maxi­
mizing point the consumer will be consuming x^ units of good X^ and Xg 
units of good Xg. If the consumer were at any point other than A on his 
budget constraint then the marginal rate of substitution of X^ for X2 
X, 2 
2 
X 2 
I* 
M/p 0 
Figure 2.3, Maximizing utility given a budget constraint 
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would not equal the ratio of prices for the two goods. The consumer 
could increase his utility by increasing his consumption of the good 
whose marginal utility divided by its price was greatest and decreasing 
his consumption of the other good to the point where equation 2.15 held. 
Graphically, if the consumer were purchasing bundle B or bundle C 
in Figure 2.3, he would not be maximizing his utility since the indif­
ference curve I** is not tangent to the particular budget line facing 
the consumer. If the consumer were at point B then 
MD MU Mil p 
—— > (which implies that > —) (2.20) 
Pi Pg ^2 P2 
and the consumer could increase his utility by consuming more and less 
X^. As he did so, the marginal utility of X^ would fall and the marginal 
utility of Xg would rise. He would continue to substitute X^ for Xg 
until he reached point A where equation 2.15 holds. If the consumer 
were initially at point C the direction of inequality in equation 2.20 
would be reversed and the consumer would substitute X^ for X^ until he 
reached point A. Point A is the utility maximizing point for the 
consumer given his budget constraint. 
It is possible that the consumer is not able to equalize his mar­
ginal rate of substitution of X^ for X^ with the ratio of the prices of 
the two goods. If for example equation 2.20 holds then the above 
analysis tells us that the consumer desires to substitute X^ for X^ in 
his consumption bundle. If the individual is already consuming X^ 
exclusively, then he is not able to substitute X^ for X^ since he has 
no Xg and he is constrained to having a nonnegative amount of all goods 
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in his consumption bundle. In this case he will spend his entire income 
on one good, X^. Graphically, the consumer will be at point D in 
Figure 2.4. 
The above analysis extends easily to the n-good case. The con­
sumer's utility function in the n-good case is given by 
U = U(xj^, Xg, ..., x^) (2.21) 
and his budget constraint by 
n 
M = p^x^ + ... + p^x^ = S p.x^. (2.22) 
i=l 
The Lagrangian function to be maximized is: 
L = U(x,, X,, ..., X ) + X(M - Z p.x.). (2.23) 
i=l ^ ^  
For a utility maximum at an interior point the first-order conditions 
are: 
^ ^  - Xpj = 0; i = 1, 2, ..., n (2.24) 
and 
JT ® 
^ = M - 2 p.x, = 0. (2.25) 
dA. 1 1 
By taking ratios of the equations in equation 2.24 we get a generaliza­
tion of equation 2.15. 
MU MU MU 
It is assumed, of course, that the Hessian is negative-definite for a 
utility maximum. 
I* X, 2 
M 
2 
0 X 
1 
Figure 2.4. A utility maximum when only one good is consumed 
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For a utility maximum at a boundary the first-order conditions are: 
MU, MU„ MU. MU.., MU 
and 
M = S px.. (2.28) 
i=l 1 
Again the Hessian is assumed to be negative-definite. In this case the 
individual will consume positive amounts of the first i goods and zero 
amounts of the remaining n-i goods. 
A Two Person Model of Exchange 
This section outlines a simple two person model of exchange. The 
individuals are called individual A and individual B. Each of these 
individuals is assumed to have a strictly private utility function: 
^A " ^A^*l^' ^ 2^) Ug = Ug(x^^, Xg^). (2,29) 
It is initially assumed that there are two goods, and X^. These two 
goods are assumed to be in fixed supply, X^ = and Xg = Xg. The 
supply of the two goods is distributed between individual A and Individual 
B so that Xj^^ + = X^ and = Xg. 
Since the amounts of X^ and X^ are fixed for the time period under 
consideration, the maximum amount that either individual can consume is 
X^ units of X^ and X^ units of Xg. In Figure 2.5a we have drawn the 
relevant area of consumer A's commodity space. It is a rectangle of 
dimensions O^X^ by O^X^. Individual B's relevant commodity space has the 
same d imensions (F igure 2.5b). 
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A* 
Figure 2.5a. Individual A's commodity space 
B** 
** 
B* 
Figure 2.5b. Individual B's commodity space 
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The manner by which goods are produced, how much of each is pro­
duced, and how the supply of goods is initially allocated is not of 
interest here. Our concern is only with the movement from the initial 
distribution to the final distribution. 
The initial distribution of the two goods is assumed to give A 
A A 
units of and units of (point A* in Figure 2.5a). B will 
B — A B — A 
initially have Xj^ = X^ - units of X^ and Xg = Xg - Xg units of 
Xg (point B* in Figure 2.5b). Point A* lies on A's indifference curve 
labeled and point B* lies on B's indifference curve Ig*. If there 
is some "central authority" that has the power to set relative prices 
for X^ and X^ (P1/P2) then there will be a line through both points A* 
and B* with the slope (-p^/pg). If these price lines are tangent to both 
I^* at point A* and Ig* at point B* then both A and B will be maximizing 
their utility and there will be no incentive for them to trade with each 
other. If, however, the price line is not tangent to I^* or/and 1^* then 
there will be incentive for one or both individuals to initiate trade. 
Each will act out of the purely selfish motive of maximizing his own 
utility. 
In Figures 2.5a and 2.5b it is seen that at the price ratio p^/pg 
individual A is maximizing his utility while individual B is not. At 
the price ratio p^/pg individual B could increase his utility by consuming 
more X^ and less X^. At the given price ratio and his initial bundle of 
goods (which together define his income constraint), B's utility maximiz­
ing point is given by point B**. Point B** is the tangency point between 
the price line that runs through point B* and B's indifference curve 
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Ig**. B desires to move from point B* to point B**. In the two person 
case, the only way he can achieve this movement is through trade with 
individual A. Since A is already maximizing his utility given the price 
ratio and his initial allocation he will refuse to trade at the given 
price ratio. If neither A nor B is able to adjust (or influence the 
adjustment of) the relative prices then A will keep his initial alloca­
tion A* and B will keep his initial allocation B* even though B would 
prefer to be at point B**. In this case there will be an excess supply 
of good equal to the difference between B's holdings of at B* and 
B**. Likewise there will be an excess demand for good X^ equal to the 
difference in B's actual holdings of X^ at B* and his desired holdings 
at B**. 
This can be seen more clearly if the two graphs (Figures 2.5a and 
2.5b) are combined into one. If Figure 2.5b is rotated 180 degrees and 
superimposed upon Figure 2.5a we get Figure 2.6. Figure 2.6 is commonly 
called the Edgeworth box in economic literature. The dimensions of the 
box are the same as those in Figures 2.5a and 2.5b, X^ by X^. The origin 
for individual A is 0^ in the southwest corner of the box and that for 
individual B is Og in the northeast corner. A's level of utility in­
creases as he moves in a northeasterly direction and B's increases as he 
moves in a southwesterly direction. A's initial allocation is as before 
(x^^ and as is B's (x^^ = X^ - x^^ and X2^ = X^ - x^^). Thus points 
A* and B* are the single point - point C. As before I^* and Ig* are the 
indifference curves that contain point C. 
X, 2 
A 
2 
I ** 
-Pi /P 
Figure 2.6. The Edgeworth box 
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The original price line (-p^/pg) is drawn so as to be tangent to 
at C as before. At this price ratio A is maximizing his utility 
while B would maximize his at point D (equal to point B** in Figure 2.5b). 
Clearly a move from C to D is in B's best interest. It is just as clear, 
however, that A will not be willing to make the move since the movement 
from C to D will leave him on an indifference curve lower than the one he 
has already attained. In order for A to be willing to trade with B, the 
final distribution must be on or to the northeast of I^*. Likewise B 
will not trade unless he ends up on or to the southwest of Ig*. There­
fore, trade will only take place in the shaded area of Figure 2.6 bounded 
by I^* and Ig*. 
In order that the final distribution be a Pareto efficient distri­
bution it is necessary that both consumers (traders) equate their mar­
ginal rates of substitution of for with the ratio of prices for the 
two goods. Both consumers must face the same set of relative prices and 
A B ~ 
the final distribution must be such that x^ + x^ = X^ and 
À B 
Xg + Xg = Xg. This tells us that at the point of a Pareto efficient 
distribution the marginal rates of substitution of X^ for X^ for the two 
consumers are the same. Their indifference curves are tangent at points 
of Pareto efficient distribution. The locus of these tangency points is 
called the contract curve. The final distribution, if it is to be 
efficient, must lie on the contract curve. Further, the final distribu­
tion is restricted to lie on that portion of the contract curve which is 
bounded by the two indifference curves that pass through the initial 
distribution. 
w 
00 
* 
Figure 2.7. The contract curve 
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In Figure 2.7 the initial distribution of and is at point C. 
The contract curve is O^DEOg. The Pareto relevant portion of the 
contract curve is DE since along this portion neither trader is made 
worse off by a trade from point C. Individual A would like to be as 
close to point E as possible since point E maximizes his utility given 
that B's utility must not fall below its initial level represented by 
indifference curve I^^. Individual B would naturally like to be as close 
to point D as possible for a similar reason. The final, post-trade 
distribution could be anywhere along the DE segment of the contract 
curve. Its exact location will depend upon several factors. One is 
the relative bargaining strengths of the two individuals. The individual 
with the greatest bargaining power will reap most of the gains from 
trade. 
Another factor is the number of separate trades that take place 
before the contract curve is reached. If the move from point C to the 
contract curve is made in one move, it will be necessary for the relative 
price line, which defines the terms of trade, to be tangent to each of 
the relevant indifference curves and to pass through the point C. This 
condition is shown in Figure 2.8 where point C is the initial distribu­
tion, point F is the final distribution (on the contract curve) and 
-pl/p2 is the ratio of prices or terms of trade. The price line is tan-
2 2 
gent to both I^ and Ig at point F and passes through point C. If there 
is only one set of relative prices that gives rise to a one-move final 
distribution on the contract curve (there may be several or there may be 
none), then, given that it takes only one trade to reach the final 
X, 2 
0, 
'k 
Figure 2.8. A one trade move to the contract curve 
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distribution from the initial distribution, the final distribution will 
be uniquely determined. In one-trade situations, the bargaining 
strengths of the individuals will not enter unless there is more than 
one set of relative prices which will give rise to an efficient final 
distribution. 
If it takes more than one trade to reach the contract curve from the 
initial distribution, then the final distribution will depend, in part, 
upon the sequence of trades. Each trade that does not lead to a Pareto 
efficient distribution will reduce the portion of the contract curve that 
is relevant for future trades. In Figure 2.9 the initial distribution is 
at point C and the portion of the contract curve that is of relevance 
before any trade takes place is DE. Let the first trade between A and B 
be inefficient in the sense that the distribution obtained is not a point 
on the (DE segment of the) contract curve. The terms of trade (-p^/pg) 
lie within the trading area so that there is an incentive for the two 
traders to make a trade. In general, given the terms of trade, one 
trader will reach a utility maximum before the other. In Figure 2.9, 
given the initial distribution and the terms of trade, trader B will 
reach a utility maximum at point G. Once he has reached point G, 
individual B will refuse to make any further exchanges at the original 
terms of trade even though individual A desires to continue exchanging 
Xg for X^. Point 6 becomes the new starting point and the new trade area 
is the Intersection of each individual's "no worse than G set" (area KGL). 
The relevant portion of the contract curve shrinks from DE to HJ. A new 
set of relative prices (terms of trade) is agreed upon and trading con­
tinues until a distribution on the contract curve is reached. 
Figure 2.9. Movement to the contract curve when more than one trade is made 
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If part of the contract curve coincides with one of the boundaries 
(see Figure 2.10) then, in general, the marginal rates of substitution 
will not be the same for the two individuals along this portion of the 
contract curve. In Figure 2.10 the contract curve is O^GFEDOg and 
the relevant portion, given an initial distribution at point C is DEP. 
Between D and E the contract curve coincides with the boundary indicating 
a zero consumption of good by trader B. Along this segment (DE) the 
individuals' marginal rates of substitution of for X^ should not be 
equal except at point E. At all points on DE other than E, the marginal 
rate of substitution of X^ for X^ will be less for individual A than for 
individual B. If the contract curve coincides with another boundary, 
then the marginal rate of substitution of X^ for X^ migjht be greater for 
individual A than for individual B. 
If we extend the analysis presented in this section to the n-good 
case (with n > 2) the results will remain basically the same. If an 
interior solution exists, then there will be at least one set of exchange 
ratios (set of prices) which will lead to this interior solution. For 
this interior solution the two traders will still equate their marginal 
rates of substitution for any two commodities with the exchange ratios 
for these commodities. If a solution lies on one of the boundaries of 
the restricted n-space consumption set, then one of the traders is con­
suming all of the relevant good and the other trader is not consuming any 
of that good. Let us define a "bounded" good as a good which is not 
consumed by one of the consumers. When bounded goods are present the two 
traders will continue to equate their marginal rates of substitution for 
Figure 2.10. The contract curve coincides with a boundary of the consumption set 
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each pair of the "nonbounded" goods with the relative prices (terms of 
trade) for those goods. The relative prices of the "bounded" goods and 
any other good must fall between the marginal rates of substitution of 
the two traders for the two goods if a Pareto efficient point on the 
boundary of the consumption set is to be reached. The only exception 
would be when the indifference surfaces of the two traders are just 
tangent at the boundary. This would occur at a point such as point E 
in Figure 2.10. When this occurs the ratio of prices for the "bounded" 
and "nonbounded" goods must equal both traders' marginal rates of sub­
stitution for those two goods. 
This section has been concerned with exchange in a two person world. 
In this section the two individuals were assumed to have strictly private 
utility functions, a restriction which will be relaxed in the next 
section. 
Â Two Person Model of Exchange When 
Utility Functions are Interdependent^ 
In this section we will present a two person, two good exchange 
model when the utility function of at least one individual exhibits inter-
dependencies related to the other individual. We will begin by analyz­
ing the case in which only one of the individuals has an interdependent 
utility function and then move to the case where both individuals have 
interdependent utility functions. 
As in the previous section we are concerned only with how individuals 
will redistribute their initial allocation of goods. We are not looking 
^is section has been influenced by [4; 5; 12; 13; 41; 45]. 
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at the production side of the market and are not here interested in how 
the initial distribution came about. In order to simplify the mathe­
matics we will assume that there are only two goods in our hypothetical 
world - good and good X^. Each of these two goods is assumed to be 
a homogeneous product that is in fixed supply. The total amount of each 
good X^ and X^ is divided between our two individuals - individual A and 
A A 
individual B. Individual A has x^ units of X^ and Xg units of Xg; B 
B B 
has x^ units of X^ and x^ units of Xg. We have already stated the 
B B 
constraints that x^ + x^ = X^ and x^ + x^ = X^. We assume that the 
tastes of the two individuals are given for the period under considera­
tion. We assume that exchanges and transfers can be made costlessly and 
we assume nonappropriation - an individual cannot be forced to take 
actions not in his own best interest. 
Given the above assumptions and the fact that only one of the two 
individuals (say individual A) has an interdependent utility function, 
we may write the utility function of the two individuals as: 
"A ^2^' V' (2.30) 
and 
Ub = UfiCXi®, X2^. (2.31) 
The fact that B's consumption of goods X^ and X^ and his utility 
function Ug enter A*s utility function indicates that B's consumption 
behavior may influence A in two distinct ways. First, B's consumption 
of X^ and X^ may directly influence A's utility. If such an influence 
g 
exists we say a "goods" externality is present. ôU^/ôX^ f 0; i = 1 
and/or 2 indicates that a "goods" externality is present. Second, B's 
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consumption of and X^ may indirectly influence A*s utility. In this 
instance A will be influenced by B's general level of utility without 
regard to how B attains that level. We call this type of influence a 
"utility" externality and denote it by # 0. "Goods" and 
g 
"utility" externalities may occur together fôU^/ôX^ f 0, i = 1 and/or 2, 
and ^ 0) or separately (ôU^/ôX^^ = 0, i = 1, 2 and f 0 
or âU^/ôX^® 0, i = 1 and/or 2 and SU^/SUg = 0). If both externalities 
are nonexistent (ôU^/ôX,^ = 0, i = 1, 2 and ôU^/âUg = 0) then the 
situation is one in which both individuals have strictly private utility 
functions. This situation was discussed in the preceding section. The 
distinction between a "goods" externality and a "utility" externality 
is not as important as has been assumed by others [12, pp. 3, 14]. At 
least it is not important in the two person case when goods are in fixed 
supply. We will discuss this issue later in this section. 
In order to find the slopes of the indifference curves for A and B 
we follow the same procedure used in the first section of this chapter. 
For B we get the same result: 
dX ® ÔU /ÔX ® 
-h = - \ • (2.32) 
dx^ aUg/aXg 
g 
B's indifference curves are always negatively sloped since ôUg/ôX^ > 0 
(i = 1, 2). We assume the second order conditions hold which will ensure 
B's indifference curves are convex to his origin. 
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A's indifference curves are not so nicely behaved. The total 
differential of U. is:^ Â 
SB» 3». B 
+  s i r •  « • » )  
g 
If we assume perfect knowledge then (i=l, 2) in equation 2,33 
will be the same as in equation 2.32. If we do not make this assunqption, 
then these terms in equation 2.33 will be individual A's best estimates 
of B's marginal utilities. In this two person world the assunqptions that 
all goods are in fixed supply and that all exchanges and transfers can 
be made cost less ly indicate that = - dx^^ and dx^^ = - dXg^. Thus 
at A's utility maximizing point 
ôUg ^ 
The slope of A's indifference curves is given by 
^The total differential of is actually dU^ = dX^^ 
+ ÔU^/ÔX^^ dXg^ + ÔU^/ÔX^® dX^® + ÔU^/ÔX2® dXg^ + dU^. 
We have substituted the value of dU_ from equation 2.4 to get our 
equation 2.33. 
48 
a"A 
dx/ 
.Xi^ ^^B ax^B 
dx'^ "^A 
1 
aXgA 3X2® "^B 0X2® 
The slope of A's indifference curve will be dependent upon the consump­
tion of both goods by both individuals. Obviously if neither a "goods" 
externality nor a "utility" externality is present, the slope is 
dependent only on A's consumption of the two goods. 
We will continue to assume that ôU^/ôx^'^ > 0 where i • 1, 2 and 
g 
j = A, B. The signs of âU^/ôx^^ i = 1, 2 and can be positive 
g 
or negative. If 3U^/Bx^ i = 1, 2 is positive then individual A will 
receive an increase in his utility level when B consumes good X^. When 
g 
f^U^Ax^ < 0 increases in B's consumption of good will lower A's 
utility. Similarly if > 0 then A's knowledge that B's utility 
has increased will increase his own utility level. When SU^/èUg < 0 
increases in B's utility will cause decreases in A's. If 5^/BUg > 0 
we say that A is benevolent toward B and if < 0 we say he is 
malevolent toward B. We will use the same terminology with regards to 
"goods" externalities noting that if âU^/ôx^^ > 0 and ôU^/ôX^^ <0 i # j 
A will be both benevolent and malevolent toward B at the same time. This 
can cause some confusion so the terms benevolence and malevolence will 
be used when their meanings are unambiguous. If a situation should arise 
where A is both benevolent and malevolent toward B we will say A is 
benevolent toward B with respect to good X^ and malevolent with respect 
to Xj. 
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Since the slope of A's indifference curves are dependent upon the 
consumption patterns of individual B, it is no longer necessary that 
these curves always be negatively sloped. If all externalities facing 
individual A are negative (A harbors malevolent feelings toward B) then 
his indifference curves will always have a negative slope. 
Recall that the equation for A's indifference curves is 
a^ A a*A **3 
ax^^ ax^® "^B ax^ B 
"^A a^ A a*A 
axg^ a^B aXg^ 
4=2 
. A " " au. AU. au. AU_ ' (2.35) 
^1 
g 
If A holds only malevolent feelings toward B both ôU./ôx. (i = 1, 2) and 
g 
are negative. âU^/ôx^ (i = 1, 2) is always positive, of course. 
This indicates that both the numerator and denominator of the term in 
brackets are positive which means that A's indifference curves are 
negatively sloped (and convex from below given that the Hessian is 
negative-definite as assumed). 
We are concerned with A's benevolent feelings, not his malevolent 
feelings so we will deal solely with his benevolent feelings from this 
g 
point on. If A is benevolent toward B then both au^/ax^^ (1=1,2) and 
aU^/aUg are positive. We assume that the second-order derivatives 
a^U^/aXi^ (i=l,2) and a^U^/aUg^ are negative. If A's benevolence is 
strong enough then it is possible for the numerator of equation 2.35 to 
be negative, for the denominator to be negative, or for both to be nega­
tive. If only one of the denominator or numerator is negative then A's 
indifference curve will have a positively sloped section. If both are 
negative, A's Indifference curve will be negatively sloped but will have 
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the "wrong" curvature (see Figure 2.11). 
Since B's utility function is strictly private, his indifference 
1 2 
curves (Ig and ) are negatively sloped and convex to his origin in 
the northwest corner of the box. We have drawn A*s indifference curves 
1 2 (I^ , , etc.) as a series of concentric circles since the presence of 
"goods" and "utility" externalities in his utility function may lead 
portions of his indifference curves to exhibit positive slopes or 
negative slopes of the wrong curvature. These circular indifference 
curves imply that A is indifferent among all distributions of and 
between B and himself which lie on a particular curve. The point E is 
A's bliss point, the point where he gains his highest level of utility. 
Note that point E is A*s bliss point vis-a-vis the goods X^ and X^ and 
the other individual. It is not his bliss point vis-a-vis the goods X^ 
and Xg alone. If we exchanged individual B with an individual C and 
left the amounts of the two goods constant at X^ and X^, then A's bliss 
point would move unless A felt exactly the same about C as he felt about 
B. The donor individual (the individual experiencing the externalities) 
will not be indifferent to the object individual or to the characteris­
tics of the object individual. The identity of the other fellow, his 
personality, behavior patterns and other personal characteristics will 
influence the degree of benevolence shown by the donor individual. In 
general, the more benevolent A feels toward the other individual the 
closer to A's origin will be A's bliss point. It is not, however, neces­
sary for A's bliss point to fall within the boundaries of the Edgeworth 
box. 
2 
A 
Figure 2.11, An indifference map when preferences are interdependent 
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The ridge lines CED and PEG cross A's indifference curves at all 
points where the slope is either infinite or zero respectively. These 
ridge lines divide the Edgeworth box into four conceptually distinct 
regions. The region bounded by O^CEG will be called the region of pure 
exchange. Any initial distribution of goods within this region will 
lead to a point on the contract curve (O^E) by a process described in 
the previous section of this chapter. 
The regions bounded by CEF and DEG are regions of possible charity. 
Within these regions A may increase his utility by making a unilateral 
transfer to B of one of the goods (X^ in region CEF and in region 
DEG). The region bounded by FED is the region of charity. If the 
initial distribution is within this region, A can always reach his bliss 
point by transferring some of each good to B. 
Let us consider a region of possible charity. Given that the 
initial distribution is at point L in Figure 2.12, A would prefer to 
move from point L to point E since his utility is maximized at point E. 
He cannot reach E, however, since any movement he makes from point L 
is constrained to lie to the left of B's indifference curve through L 
(Ig^). At best he can reach the point P on the contract curve and B's 
indifference curve 
It might seem that the relevant portion of the contract curve is 
KP, the region between the two indifference curves through L. However, 
if A is a utility naximizer as we suppose, he will realize that he need 
be at no point to the left of M and that the relevant portion of the 
contract curve is MP. Given the initial distribution at L, A can 
X. 
Ln 
W 
Figure 2.12. Movement in a region of possible charity 
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increase his utility by means other than exchange. He can give away 
SOTie of the good and be better off than he was before. 
Recall that the first order condition for A to maximize his utility 
is given by equation 2.34 when dx^^ = - dx^^ and dx^^ = - dXg^. Now if 
we hold the distribution of constant, A will maximize his utility 
when 
dU. BU ÔU ÔU ÔU 
Â Â B • ÂÛ B ^ (2.36) 
Since L is on that particular positively sloped portion of A's indif­
ference curve shown in Figure 2.12, we know that 
and 
a^ A ^^ A 
< a:/ 
a^ A ô^ A a^ A a"B 
< ôXi® 
< 0 (2.37) 
> 0. (2.38) 
A can increase his utility by giving X^ to individual B. As he gives X^ 
to B ôU^/ôX^^ will rise since A has less of good X^, BUg/BX^® will fall 
g 
since B has more of it, and ôU^/ôX^ and will fall given our 
assumption that the second derivatives of both "goods" and "utility" 
externalities are negative. Thus dU^/dX^ will become more positive as 
A gives X^ to B. A will give X^ to B until he reaches point L' in 
A 
Figure 2.12. At this point dU^/dX^ = 0 and A is maximizing his utility 
given the constraint that the distribution of X^ remains constant. Point 
L' is not a Pareto optimum since it is still possible for both individuals 
to gain from trade. 
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With a unilateral transfer the relevant portion of the contract 
curve will shrink from MP to MN. The portion KM is not efficient for A 
since it implies that, from point L, A will transfer some of both goods 
A A 
to B. At point L dU^/dX^ > 0 and dO^/dXg <0. A will be willing to 
transfer good since this will increase his utility but he will not be 
willing to transfer good X^ since that would lower his utility. Even if 
his utility is increased when he transfers units of X^ and Xg units 
of Xg to B, he can receive a greater increase in his utility if he 
transfers only Xg units of Xg to B and makes no transfers of X^. There­
fore the relevant portion of the contract curve when the initial 
distribution is at point L is the segment MP. 
If individual A's initial distribution lies anywhere in the region 
CEF of Figure 2.12 then he can increase his utility by transferring 
units of Xg to individual B until he has reached a point on the ridge 
line CE. If trade is not allowed this movement will maximize A's 
utility and increase B's utility. Points on CE are not Pareto efficient, 
except for point E, so the movement to the ridge line is only a movement 
toward Pareto optimality. The indifference curves of the two individuals 
are not tangent on the ridge lines, except at E, so points on the ridge 
line do not represent a social optimum. Pareto optimality has not been 
achieved since there is still the opportunity for exchanges which will 
make both individuals better off. If trade is allowed from points 
within CEF, then A will prefer to exchange Xg for X^ since this will 
increase his utility more than making a unilateral transfer. This is 
why we call the region CEF a region of possible charity. Region DEG is 
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also a region of possible charity, but in this region is the good 
which yields external benefits to individual A. In this region A is 
willing to transfer units of to individual B until the ridge line DE 
is reached. He would prefer to exchange X^ for X^, however. 
Note that if A is in a region of possible charity such as at point 
L in Figure 2.12 and if this is known to B, then B can use a strategy 
against A in order to increase his expected utility. If B realizes that 
A is in a region of possible charity he can refuse to make any exchanges 
until A has maximized his utility via transfers. After A makes the move 
from L to L' B can consent to exchange X^ for X^. By using this type 
of behavior B can insure that he will end up somewhere along the MN 
portion of the contract curve and not on the NP portion. All points on 
MN are superior to points on NP for individual B. 
For this strategic behavior to work, A must realize that B may use 
it. This knowledge must be known by A when he formulates his utility 
function. If B attempts to use this strategic behavior when A does not 
expect it or is ignorant of it, then A may change his preferences in 
such a way that he becomes less benevolent towards B. The change in 
A's utility function would, of course, change A's indifference map, which 
would, in turn, affect the location of the contract curve and ridge lines. 
It may be possible that the shift in A's utility function will cause A to 
lose all interest in making a transfer to B. He certainly will desire to 
make a smaller transfer. Thus B's strategic behavior will not insure 
2 
his reaching indifference curve I^ if this strategic behavior causes a 
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change in A's preferences. B's expected utility may in fact decrease 
rather than increase as a result of his strategic behavior. 
Daly and Giertz [12, p. 3] state that the type of externality 
("goods" or "utility") will have an effect upon whether A will desire to 
transfer goods or purchasing power to B. The authors state that "the 
existence of "goods" externalities causes marginal social and private 
rates of substitution to differ with the result that, in the presence of 
such externalities, trade will not lead to Pareto optimality" [12, p. 14]. 
They also state that "donors who are subject only to "utility" exter­
nalities will also prefer redistribution in the form of purchasing 
power" [12, p. 14]. Both of these statements contain elements of truth 
and falsehood. The implications of their statements are that when only 
"goods" externalities are present redistribution will be in the form of 
goods and the contract curve will not be reached and when only "utility" 
externalities are present redistribution will be in the form of purchas­
ing power and the contract curve will be reached. These implications 
are not always realized as we shall see below. 
In the first quotation the authors incorrectly used the word trade 
when they meant transfers. If our two individuals are allowed to engage 
in trade then there is no reason why they should not reach a point on 
the contract curve. If, however, only transfers are allowed, then, 
given that A is in a region of possible charity, he will make a trans­
fer of goods to B so that he. A, has just reached his relevant ridge 
line. In this case, A's marginal rate of social substitution will not 
equal B's marginal rate of private substitution and Daly and Giertz are 
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correct in stating that Pareto optimality will not be obtained. 
The problem with their first statement lies deeper than this choice 
of words, however, because the truth of the statement hinges on their 
implicit assumption that A must not have a relevant, benevolent "goods" 
externality for every good in the consumption set. That is, the initial 
distribution must not be such that Â is in his region of charity. If A 
is initially in his region of charity, then he will be able to reach his 
bliss point by transferring some of all goods to B. A's bliss point is 
on the contract curve which makes it a Pareto efficient point. Thus 
this Daly and Giertz argument holds only when the donor is in a region 
of possible charity. 
In a two person world one cannot really make a transfer of purchasing 
power if all goods are in fixed supply. Purchasing power refers to any 
generalized medium of exchange that can be used to purchase goods or 
services. In the two person case one person can only receive what the 
other person gives up. If we equate a transfer of purchasing power in 
the two person case with a transfer of some of each good, then the 
existence of only "goods" externalities can lead to a transfer of "pur­
chasing power" if the donor is originally in his region of charity. 
The second Daly and Giertz statement concerns donors preferring 
redistribution in the form of purchasing power when only "utility" 
externalities are present. The rationale for transferring purchasing 
power is that the recipient is the best judge of what will maximize his 
utility. When the recipient maximizes his utility the donor's utility 
is supposedly maximized. In a two person, two good world in which the 
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donor experiences only "utility" externalities the slope of the donor's 
utility curve is given by 
dx^ ax/ ax B 
The donor's (A's) desire to make transfers to the recipient (B) is 
influenced by the marginal benefits he receives from such transfers and 
by his marginal costs. It may be that B's marginal utility for good X^ 
is larger than his marginal utility for good X^. If given a choice he 
would consume good X^ before he consumed good X^. A might also hold X^ 
more dear than X^. If A's own marginal valuation of X^ is great enough 
and that of X^ small enough, then A will be willing to transfer good X^ 
but not X^ even though B's utility increases most rapidly when he con­
sumes good X^. A will be in a region of possible charity with respect 
to good Xg. 
The existence of a "utility" externality only does not imply that 
the donor will be in a region of charity. Since he bases his transfer 
upon his costs as well as his benefits the donor may desire to transfer 
a specific good rather than general purchasing power (some of each good 
in the two person case). Moreover, the good the donor transfers may not 
be the one most desired by the recipient. 
Let us jump ahead a bit and look briefly at the N-person case. If 
the recipient of a transfer in the N-person case is allowed to cost-
lessly exchange the transferred good for other goods then a transfer of 
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goods will yield the same result as a transfer of purchasing power. If 
he is not allowed to exchange a transferred good for other goods then 
the two types of transfers are not the same. The recipient will receive 
more utility from a transfer of purchasing power than from the transfer 
of an equivalent value of some good. The type of transfer will not be 
determined by the type of externality the donor faces, however. As we 
have seen in the two person case, both "goods" and "utility" externali­
ties can lead to distributions in the donor's region of charity and 
region of possible charity. 
The donor will make a transfer of purchasing power only when he is 
in his region of charity. When the recipient's purchases move the donor 
out of his region of charity, the donor will stop making transfers of 
purchasing power. If the recipient's purchases move the donor to a 
region of possible charity, the donor will be willing to transfer only 
the relevant good. If he is moved to the region of exchange or to his 
bliss point, the donor will stop making transfers altogether. 
If both individuals have interdependent utility functions then the 
analysis is straightforward. In the two good case each individual may 
have a bliss point within the Edgeworth box. In Figure 2.13, A's bliss 
point is at point and B's bliss point is at point Eg. The relevant 
portion of the contract curve is E^E^. The ridge lines for A (CE^D and 
GE^F) and for B (lE^K and JE^H) divide the Edgeworth box into nine 
regions numbered one through nine.^ 
Boulding [4, pp. 70-71] presents a graph similar to Figure 2.13, 
but he incorrectly states the characteristics of all regions except those 
we have labeled 1, 2, and 3. 
Figure 2.13. Edgeworth box when both consumers have interdependent utility functions 
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In region 1 both individuals exhibit the normal trade behavior 
discussed in the second section of this chapter. In region 2, Â is 
charitable in both goods and he will transfer some of both goods to B 
so that the final distribution is at point E^. In region 3, B is chari­
table in both goods and he will make a transfer to A so as to reach 
point Eg. In regions 8 and 9 each will be possibly charitable in one 
good, but not in the same good as the other individual. In region 8 
A is possibly charitable in while B is possibly charitable in X^. 
In region 9 each is possibly charitable in the other good. An initial 
distribution in region 8 will lead (without trade) to the point M. A 
will transfer X^ to B and B will transfer X^ to A. Since the point M 
lies at the intersection of two ridge lines this is the point that will 
be reached througjh transfers alone. If trade is allowed, the final 
distribution will be on the E^E^ portion of the contract curve. Any 
initial allocation in region 9 will lead either to a point on E^E^ if 
trade is allowed or to point L if trade is not allowed. 
In regions 4, 5, 6 and 7 only one individual will be possibly 
charitable and then only in one good. In region 4 A is possibly chari­
table in Xg and in region 6 he is possibly charitable in X^. B Is 
possibly charitable in X^ and X^ in regions 7 and 5 respectively. 
Another possibility when both individuals have very strong benevo­
lent externalities is for the bliss points E^ and Eg to reverse posi­
tion as in Figure 2.14. In Figure 2.14 the ridge lines for A are CE^LD 
and FE^MG and those for B are IME^K and JLEgH. In this figure there is 
no contract curve as such. Region 1 is, in effect, a contract region 
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Figure 2.14. The Edgeworth box when both individuals have very strong benevolent feelings 
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since neither individual can make a transfer to the other without making 
the other worse off. If the initial allocation of goods leads to a 
distribution at point N in Figure 2,14, iihen A will desire to transfer 
some of both goods to individual B in such proportion that the final 
distribution is at point Likewise B will desire to move from N to 
Eg via transfers of both goods to A. Each will desire to transfer some 
of both goods to the other and, as long as each has the option of not 
accepting the other's gift, the original allocation N will be the final 
allocation. If it is considered improper to refuse to accept a gift, 
then each will accept the gift which moves the donor to his bliss point. 
The recipient will, however, either immediately or after a respectable 
period of time offer a gift to the other which will move the current 
donor to his bliss point. The final solution is not a stable solution 
if our Individuals do not have the option of refusing a gift. 
If the initial distribution Is in region 2 or 3 then there will be 
an unambiguous movement via transfers to Eg or E^ respectively. Initial 
distributions in regions 8 or 9 will lead via trade and/or transfer to 
M or L respectively. In each of the other four regions (4, 5, 6, and 7) 
one individual will desire to transfer some of each good and the other 
Individual will desire to transfer some of one good. For example, in 
region 4 In Figure 2.14 Individual A desires to transfer both and 
to individual B while B desires to transfer X^ to A. Assuming that each 
can refuse to accept the other's offer, no X^ will change hands but A 
will transfer some X^ to individual B - not to a point on E^l, A's ridge 
line, but to a point on ME^, B's ridge line. Thus if the initial 
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distribution is in regions 4, 5, 6 or 7 there will be a movement via 
transfer from that distribution to the nearest ridge line bordering 
region 1, The "wrong" individual will maximize his utility given the 
constraints but the other individual will increase his utility by making 
the transfer. 
The results of this section do generalize easily to the n-good case. 
If "utility" externalities are present then there is always the possi­
bility that a region of charity will occur. We say there is the possi­
bility it may occur because the benevolent feelings of both individuals 
may be so weak that the bliss points of both individuals lie outside the 
hypercube that forms the commodity set of the individuals. If this 
region does occur, then once an individual reaches this region he will 
transfer some of every good to the other individual until his bliss 
point is reached. If an individual is in a region of possible charity 
then he will be willing to transfer at least one but less than n-goods 
to the other individual. In the n-good case it is possible for up to 
n-1 goods to be in an individual's region of possible charity. The 
individual will be willing to transfer the goods in his region of possible 
charity until he reaches a ridge hyperplane or until the other individual 
refuses to accept the good(s). When the individual reaches a ridge 
hyperplane he will stop transferring one or more goods but will continue 
to transfer others until he reaches the boundary of either the pure 
exchange set or the pure contract set. In the two good case these sets 
are region 1 of Figure 2.13 and Figure 2.14 respectively. 
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If only "goods" externalities are present in the n-good case then 
there will be no region of charity unless one or both individuals have 
benevolent externalities from all n goods. If externalities are only 
present on p < n goods then the individual may have regions of possible 
charity but he would not have a region of charity. The analysis of these 
regions is exactly like that discussed under "utility" externalities 
above. 
An Application of Interdependent Utility Functions^ 
In this section the analysis developed in the last section will be 
applied to explain the increase in charitable contributions that are 
often observed following natural or personal disasters. De Alessi [l4] 
notes that charity tends to increase immediately following a disaster 
and he attempts to explain this increase in giving through an interde­
pendent model. His model assumes that charity is one of many goods in 
the consumer's consumption set and that in equilibrium the consumer will 
equate ^ch^rity'^^Charity for all other goods. After a 
disaster a dollar's worth of charity will yield more utility to the donor 
than it did before, not because the donor's marginal utility of charity 
has increased due to a change in his preferences but because his knowl­
edge of the disaster has reduced his search costs for a suitable object 
of charity. 
^See [13, p. 23]. 
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Our approach will differ from De Alessi's so that we may use the 
tools developed in the preceding section. Since we are restricting 
ourselves to a two person, two good world we will define a charitable 
action as any transfer of goods from one individual to the other. For 
simplicity we will assume that B has a strictly private utility function 
and that A's utility function exhibits benevolent externalities with 
regards to B. We assume that the amounts of the two goods (X^ and X^) 
are fixed at X^ units and X^ units. Let us assume that in the pre-
disaster state the individuals have reached an equilibrium at point L 
in Figure 2.15. Point E is, of course, A's bliss point and the contract 
curve is O^LE. and are the indifference curves for A and B 
respectively that pass through the point L. At this equilibrium point 
6 A B " A 
B is consuming x^ = X^ - x^ units of good X^ and Xg = X^ - Xg units 
of good Xg. 
Now let some disaster strike individual B. Suppose that for some 
reason he loses one half of his holdings of good X^. His holding of X^ 
we assumed to be unaffected by the disaster. B will now have holdings 
B gl g 
of Xg units of Xg as before and Xj^ = 1/2 x^ units of X^. In 
Figure 2.15, B's origin will shift from Qg to 0^^. The total amount of 
X^ available to the two individuals will shrink from X^ to X^ = X^- 1/2 
g 
x^ . Point L still indicates the distribution of goods between the two 
individuals but it no longer represents an optimal distribution. The 
slopes of both indifference cuirves through L will change and these new 
indifference curves will represent lower levels of utility for each 
individual. 
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2 
The slope of B's new indifference curve through point L (I^ ) will 
be steeper than his original curve throu^ that point (1^^). To see 
this let us look at the total derivative of B's utility function: 
BU. _ ÔU_ _ 
dU- = --Sr dX.B + --S- dx/. (2.40) 
g 
B's holdings of have not changed so dX^ = 0. His holdings of X^ 
g 
have decreased and since aUg/BX^ > 0 B's total utility will fall. As 
B 2 B^ 
it falls ôUg/ôXj^ will increase since ô Ug/3X^ <0. At the new, lower 
level of utility the equation for B's indifference curve will be 
dx ® ax * 
axj® 
This is the same equation he has for all his indifference curves includ-
1 B 
ing Ig . Since B's consumption of X^ is constant, ôUg/ôX^ is constant 
both before and after the disaster. The disaster decreased his holdings 
B B B 
of X^ which increased BUg/BX^ so dX^ /dX^ after the disaster is greater 
g g 
than dXg /dX^ before the disaster and the slope of the new indifference 
curve through point L is steeper than the old, 
A's new indifference curve through the point L will become less 
negatively sloped and may even become positively sloped. This new 
indifference curve will also represent a lower level of utility for A. 
The total derivative for A's utility function is 
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au. A su ôu ôu ôu . 
BU. âu ÔU 
o 
When disaster strikes individual B, A's utility is lowered if 9U^/3X^ 
and BU^/SUg are positive as we have assumed. The decrease in B's 
holdings of will increase au^/ax^^, BU^/ôU^ and 3Ug/BX^^ if all 
second derivatives (ô^U^/ôXj^^ , ô^U^/ôUg^ and ô^Ug/ôX^^® ) are negative 
as assumed. After the disaster at point L has been lowered even 
though A's holdings of X^ and X^ have not changed. The equation for A's 
indifference curve is 
"^a 
ax/ ax * ax * ^"b ax * 
^ -5 _ i L L /n AO \ 
dx/" ^"A ^^A a'A a'B 
ax/ ax/ '"B aXj' 
given dX^^ = - dX^^. This last equation will not hold at the time of 
disaster but it will hold before and after the disaster. The denominator 
of the right hand side will be slightly smaller in the post-disaster 
period since &U&/&Ug will have increased. The numerator will be even 
smaller since SU^/ôUg, and ^ Ug/aX^^ will all have increased. 
Thus A's indifference curve through the point L will be less negatively 
sloped in the post-disaster period and may even have a positive slope. 
Individual A may move into a region of possible charity after the 
disaster. 
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If the increase in is large enough it is possible that A 
will move into his region of charity. We would expect A to move into 
his region of charity more often after a disaster that reduced B's 
holdings of all goods than after a disaster that reduced B's holdings 
of only a few goods. Whether A is moved to a region of possible charity 
or to his region of charity will depend in part upon the degree of his 
benevolence toward B and in part upon the amount of devastation the 
disaster levies upon B. 
In Figure 2.15 the post-disaster situation is depicted by the 
dotted lines. B's new origin has moved to 0^^ from 0^ and his new 
2 indifference curve through L is Ig . A's new indifference curve through 
2 2 2 
L is the dotted circle I^ . Both I^ and Ig represent lower levels 
of utility than I^^ and Ig^. A's bliss point has moved from E to E'. 
The new contract curve (OE*) will be above and to the left of the old 
contract curve. This is as expected since B's loss of makes more 
dear to him and makes him more willing to exchange X^ for X^. A is 
shown to be in a region of possible charity and he is willing to trans­
fer IK units of X^ to B although he would rather exchange his X^ for X^ 
at terms that would allow him to move from L to E'. 
This application of interdependent utility functions has shown that 
the observed charitable behavior which follows disaster need not be 
brought about by a change in the tastes of the philanthropic individual 
but can be explained as rational and predictable behavior on the part of 
this individual. 
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CHAPTER III. THE N PERSON CASE 
In Chapter II we analyzed individual voluntary transfer behavior in 
a world in which there were only two individuals. While convenient for 
expressing basic concepts and for ease of graphical exposition the two-
person case is not an accurate description of reality when there are more 
than two individuals in society. In this chapter we shall extend the 
analysis of the two-person case to a general N-person case. We shall 
continue to utilize the interdependent utility function as the prime 
generator for interpersonal transfers; however» as we shall see, the 
analysis becomes more ccmplicated in a many person world. 
We will work through the N-person case in a step-by-step fashion. 
First we shall look at the case where only one individual has an inter­
dependent utility function. In this world there will be N-1 possible 
recipients of transfers but only one possible donor. Next we will look 
at a case where some subset of society, say K individuals, have inter­
dependent utility functions. Initially we will assume that the recipient 
individuals of each donor form a set that is mutually exclusive of the 
recipients of all other donors. We will remove this assumption and move 
to situations involving common recipients for several donors and donors 
being recipients of other donors. Finally we shall examine the situation 
in which all recipients as well as donors have interdependent utility 
functions. In the last section we shall briefly discuss the formation 
of charitable organizations. 
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The Single Donor 
In this section and in most of this chapter we will make the follow­
ing assumptions. We assume that there are N individuals in the society 
of which K are donors (1 ^  K ^  N) and at least N-K are potential recipi­
ents. K = 1 in this section. There are M goods (X., ..., X ) each of 
i m 
which is initially distributed among the N individuals and each of which 
is fixed in supply during each period of time. As in Chapter II, we are 
not concerned here with how the M goods are produced nor are we concerned 
with how they are initially distributed among the N members of society. 
We are concerned with how they are redistributed after the initial dis­
tribution has taken place. 
It is assumed that each consumer acts rationally. He behaves in 
such a manner that he maximizes his own utility. It is assumed that all 
transfers can be made costlessly. The assumption of nonappropriation is 
also made. Individuals are free to make voluntary transfers but they are 
not free to seize the goods which belong to another. 
The utility function for the donor individual is as follows: 
Individual 1 is concerned not only about his own level of consumption but 
also about the consumption and utility levels of the other N-1 individ­
uals in his society. 
The utility function of the other N-1 individuals is given by: 
• • • > 
' *N1 
(3.1) 
£2 ^ • • • ' 
X^); i = 2, 3, ..., N (3.2) 
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These individuals are selfish in the usual economic connotation of that 
word. 
It is assumed that these utility functions are twice differentlable 
and that the functions and their derivatives are continuous. The utility 
maximizing conditions for the N-1 potential recipients is found by taking 
the total derivative of their utility functions and setting it equal to 
zero: 
Bu ÔU au 
The first order conditions for a utility maximum are that the slope of 
the Indifference surface in the plane of any two goods must equal the 
negative of the ratio of the marginal utilities for those two goods. The 
consumption of all other goods is assumed to be constant. 
dx.. au./ax-
ax " " au./ax ' ^il " l î' j» k. (3.4) 
IK. 1 IJ 
The set of second partial derivatives is the bordered Hessian which is 
assumed to be negative definite so that the first order conditions 
lead to a utility maximum. 
The total differential of the donor's utility function is: 
m au, n au au au 
" jEi ^âx^ i=2 ^ âx^^ 
Assuming again that the bordered Hessian Is negative definite, the 
first order conditions for a utility maximum for the donor are that: 
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^ i=2 S%iL S%iL ^^IL (3 gj 
dX,. au, n ÔU, 3U, au. dX.„ 
^ + y r—— + —- ——1 —— r ^ LîiY îilT TlY J 
i=2 ^^iK '^IK 
with dX^j = 0 for j # K, L. 
The first term in both the numerator and denominator of the right hand 
side is the donor's own consumption component of the ratio of marginal 
utilities. If he were not concerned with the welfare or consumption 
levels of other individuals, then these would be the only terms on the 
right hand side. He would have the sane first order conditions as the 
other economically selfish individuals. 
The second term in the numerator and denominator of the right hand 
side measures the "goods" and "utility" externalities experienced by the 
donor individual. The first portion of this second term tells how the 
donor's utility will directly react to an increase in the recipients' 
consumption of a particular good. We will assume that BU^/BX^^ ^  0 and 
2 2 
a U^/BX^j ^ 0. There is no reason why ôU^^/QX^^ should not become 
negative, if it is initially positive, after X^^ reaches some level that 
is critical in either an absolute or a relative sense. We assume that it 
is positive if the donor makes voluntary transfers which are brought 
about by benevolent feelings toward the potential recipient. 
The second portion of this second term, 3U^/BU^ ' ôU^/ôX^^, tells 
how the donor's utility increases with increases in the recipient's 
utility. Note that in this case ôU^/ôX^^ is not individual I's marginal 
utility of good j but rather is the donor's inference of that marginal 
utility. The dX^^/dX^^^ term is the negative of the fraction of the 
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donor's transfer of the good going to the i^^ recipient. Recall 
that 
so that 
^Ij + %2j + + ^ nj " (3.7) 
dXj = 0 = dX^j + dXgj + ... + dX^j (3.8) 
which implies that 
n 
(3.9) 
Therefore, 
dX.. dX 
dX,. n • (3.10) 
k=2 
In the two person case this fraction is always minus one since the 
recipient necessarily receives what the donor transfers. 
Given equation 3.6, when will the donor have an incentive to make a 
voluntary transfer to one or more of the potential recipients? The 
answer is, of course, when he is in a region of possible charity or the 
region of charity. In the two person case the donor was in a region 
of possible charity whenever 
ôu ôu au au 
ax;; - Pââ;: + âô; ax;?] < ° «or seme j. (3.11) 
and he was in the region of charity whenever this condition held for all 
j. Of course, dXg^/dX^^ = -1 in the two person case. In the many person 
case the analogous condition might seem to be: 
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au n ÔU ÔU ÔU 
^ ÂF" ÂÏT"] ^  ° for some j, (3.12) 
° Ij i=2 ° ij ° 1 °^ij 
but this is not necessarily the case. This condition is neither 
sufficient nor necessary for the donor to voluntarily transfer good j to 
one or more recipients if the good j is a strictly private good. If good 
j is a private good when held by the donor but exhibits public goods 
attributes when transferred, then, under certain circumstances, equation 
3.12 is the necessary condition which must be satisfied before a trans­
fer will be made. The certain circumstances will be given later in this 
section. An example of a good which is a purely private good when held 
by the donor and a public good after it has been transferred would be 
works of art given by a private collector to a public museum. 
Since the good being transferred is not generally a public good in 
the sense that every recipient can consume the total amount of the good 
without reducing the amount available to other recipients, it follows 
that if the donor transfers one unit of good j then this unit of good j 
must be divided among the other N-1 individuals. (Sane individuals can 
receive a zero share of the transfer.) In order for the transfer of a 
private good to increase the donor's utility it is necessary that 
au. au au au 
âx[7 " [âxTT âûT axT?] < ° 
for at least one of the other N-1 individuals. If this is the case then 
the donor may make transfers (of good j) to individual I until: 
au, au, au, au. 
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or until 
BU, au au au, 
âx^T " [âxTT * âûT âxTT^ ^  ° 
and 
au, au, au au au, au. 
If this latter event should occur then the donor might make transfers to 
both individuals I and K in such proportions that the above equality is 
maintained. This will continue until 
au, p au, au, au, dx.. 
^ ' i=2 ^  
1=2 « 
where P is equal to the number of individuals receiving transfers from 
the donor plus one. 
An example will clarify this point. Suppose we have one donor, 
individual 1, and three potential recipients, individuals 2, 3, and 4. 
The initial distribution of goods is assumed given. With this initial 
dieCribution suppose that individual I's marginal utility with respect 
to some good j is given by 
.4 dX,. + .6 dX-. + .3 dX,. + .7 dX, .. (3.18) 
Ij 2j 3j 4j 
In this case aU^/ôX^^ = 0.4; aU^/aX^^ + aU^/aU^ • aU^/aXgj = 0.6; 
aU]^/ax^j + au^/au^ • au^/ax^^ = 0.3; and, au^/ax^^ + au^/au^ • au^/ax^^ 
=0.7. It is readily apparent that individual 1 can increase his 
utility by transferring some units of good j to either of individuals 2 
or 4. He could not increase his utility by transferring to individual 3 
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since he would gain 0.3 utils per unit transferred but would give up 
0.4. Transferring one unit of good j to individual 2 would yield 
individual 1 a net utility increase of 0.2 utils. A similar transfer to 
individual 4 would give him a net increase of 0.3 utils. Therefore he 
will make initial transfers to individual 4 only, since this will give 
him the greatest increase in utility. 
As individual 1 transfers units of good j to individual 4 his own 
marginal valuation of the good will increase since he has fewer units of 
the good to consume. Since individual 4 is now consuming more of good 
j individual I's marginal valuation of individual 4's consumption will 
fall. If the marginal valuation of his own consumption rises faster 
than his marginal valuation of individual 4's consumption falls then 
individual 1 might make transfers to individual 4 only. His post-
transfer marginal utility function mi^t look like 
0.62 dX^j + 0.6 dXgj + 0.3 dX^^ + 0.62 dX^y (3.19) 
Since he made no transfer to individuals 2 and 3, dX^^ = dX^^ = 0. All 
transfers went to individual 4 so that dX^^ = -dX^^ and by substitution 
0.62 dX^j - 0.62 dX^j = 0. (3.20) 
Equation 3.14 is satisfied. 
If individual I's marginal valuation of his own consumption rises 
more slowly than the fall in his marginal valuation of individual 4's 
consumption, then he will reach a point where he receives as much addi­
tional utility by transferring some units of good j to individual 2 as 
he does by transferring them to individual 4. Suppose after transferring 
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some units of good j to individual 4 the donor's marginal utility 
function (with respect to good j) looks as follows: 
0.48 dX.. + 0.6 dXg. + 0.3 dX.. + 0.6 dX,.. (3.21) 
Ij oj 4j 
At this point individual 1 will divide his transfers between individuals 
2 and 4. He will divide the transfers in such a way that his marginal 
valuation for the consumption of the two recipients remains the same. 
This does not mean that he will divide his transfers equally between the 
two individuals. If the marginal valuation for one recipient falls more 
rapidly than that for the other recipient then the first recipient will 
receive a smaller share of the transfers than the second recipient. 
Individual 1 will make transfers until the marginal valuation of his 
own consumption is equal to his marginal valuation of the consumption of 
each individual recipient. At this point individual I's marginal utility 
function might look like 
0.58 dX^j + 0.58 dXgj + 0.58 dX^^ + 0.3 dX^y (3.22) 
Dividing through by dX^^ and assuming that at this point dX^^ = -2/3 dX^^ 
and dX^j = -1/3 dX^^ we find: 
0.58 - 0.58 (2/3) - 0.58 (1/3) + 0.3 (0) = 0. (3.23) 
Thus equation 3.17 is satisfied. 
Before this example we stated that the donor might make transfers 
if favorable externalities existed, not that he would make transfers. 
We know from Chapter II that he would definitely make transfers only if 
he were in his region of charity. If he were in his region of possible 
charity, the donor would prefer to trade the externality generating goods 
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for other goods at a price below the market price only if his trading 
partner(s) were the individual(s) causing the "goods" or "utility" 
externality. Even though the donor would prefer to make his transfer by 
trading at less than the market terms of trade he would still be able to 
increase his utility by freely transferring the good to the chosen 
recipient(s). 
It should be noted that as in Chapter II, if the donor does maximize 
his utility by making free transfers to one or more recipients, the 
resulting post-transfer position will not be a Pareto optimal position. 
At this point either the numerator or denominator of equation 3.6 will be 
zero so that the slope of the donor's indifference surface will be either 
zero or infinity in the relevant plane. The slope of the recipient's 
indifference curve in that same plane will be negative. The transfer 
does not lead to a Pareto efficient point. 
Observe that in the case where the good in question is a purely 
private good the donor could have malevolent feelings toward all 
Individuals in the society save one and still transfer some units of 
that good. If his benevolent feelings toward that one Individual, say 
individual K, were such that 
he could still increase his utility by making a transfer of good j to 
individual K. 
(3.24) 
even thougjh 
N AIT ATI ATI 
Z (3.25) 
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A few points should be noted in regard to the transfer of a 
strictly private good. First, it is not necessary for the first trans­
fer to be made to the poorest or neediest person in the society. If 
the donor makes a transfer, he will make the transfer to that individual 
whose needs and welfare most concern him. That is, he will make the 
initial transfer to the individual causing the largest externality 
[rr?— + ^—], and this individual will not necessarily be the 
j ij 
poorest individual in the society. The question of need will no doubt be 
a factor influencing the donor's utility function, but there is no 
reason why this factor should carry the greatest weight in the determina­
tion of that function. We shall shortly clarify this point with an 
example from the literature. 
Â second point to be noted is that even if the donor realizes that 
the recipient is not particularly fond of the transferred good 
is small) and that he gets little utility from the consumption of addi­
tional units of the good, the donor may still transfer that good to the 
recipient if: 1) the donor looks upon the good as a merit good whose 
consumption is good for the recipient is large); or, 2) if the 
donor incurs little loss in utility from not consuming the good himself 
(aU^/aX^j is small compared with SU^/^X^^ for all k f j). Note that if 
the potential recipient does not desire the good (ôU^/^X^^ < 0 from 
individual I's point of view) then we assume that he can refuse the trans­
fer. The fact that the donor offers him a good or goods does not mean he 
is obliged to accept them. 
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A third point to note is that even if the donor does not really 
think the recipient should consume a particular good is zero 
or negative) he may still make the transfer of that good if: 1) he 
knops it will increase the recipient's utility by a large amount 
is large and or 
2) he receives little utility from the good himself. In this latter case 
it will still be necessary that • 3U^/ôX_ > 3U^/aX^j - 9U^/3X.^. 
In regards to the point concerning making transfers to the neediest 
individual first, we should like to refer the reader to the articles by 
Hochman and Rodgers [22] and Von Furstenberg and Mueller [49]. Hochman 
and Rodgers hypothesized a situation in which every person made a trans­
fer of money to each person whose initial income was lower than his own 
and received a money transfer from each individual whose initial income 
was higher than his own. The size of these transfers was based on the 
size of the initial income differential between income classes. They 
did not propose a specific model which would bring this about. 
Von Furstenberg and Mueller on the other hand presented a model 
which had transfers being made only to individuals in the lowest income 
class. We will call the Von Furstenberg and Mueller approach the income 
floor approach to transfers. Brennan and Walsh [8] stated that they 
considered the Hochman and Rodgers formulation to be the more general 
but that they were unable to obtain the Von Furstenberg and Mueller 
results through any meaningful modification of the Hochman and Rodgers 
formulation. 
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If the level of transfers is based solely upon initial income 
differentials, regardless of the level of incomes as in the Hochman and 
Rodgers formulation, then an income floor result cannot be obtained 
unless there are only two income groups. If there are three income 
groups, then the Hochman and Rodgers formulation can lead to the 
appearance of an income floor result if the amount the richer group 
transfers to the middle income group is just equal to the amount the 
middle income group transfers to the lower income group. Under the 
Hochman and Rodgers assumption, this will occur whenever the income 
differential between the higher and middle groups is just equal to the 
differential between the middle and lower group. With more than three 
income groups we will never observe an income floor under the Hochman 
and Rodgers formulation. The Von Furstenberg and )6ieller income floor 
approach will never lead to a situation where transfers are made to a 
group other than the group with the lowest income. Neither model is 
the more general. Both are special cases of a more general model that 
will be developed below. 
Before proceeding we should note that Hochman and Rodgers and Von 
Furstenberg and Mueller assumed that all transfers were processed through 
a collective agency. Individuals were taxed according to their marginal 
benefit from transfers and the transfers were allocated in accordance 
with the taxpayers' wishes. We shall assume that all transfers are 
voluntary and that there is only one donor. We are assuming the exis­
tence of only one potential donor to be consistent with the objectives 
of this section. In our analysis we shall follow the other authors in 
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assuming that only income levels enter an individual's utility function. 
We realize that this assumption is restrictive, that utility interde­
pendence may flow from wealth, from the consumption of certain goods, 
from particular forms of behavior, or from any of a number of other non-
income variables. We use income levels as utility function arguments 
in order to simplify the analysis. 
Both sets of authors started from a similar set of assumptions in 
developing their models. They both assumed an interpersonal utility 
function with income levels as arguments: 
U. = fj(Y^, Yg, ..., Y^, ..., Y^).l (3.26) 
They also assumed that 1) all transfers must lead to a Pareto better 
position; 2) all transfers flow from persons with higher incomes to 
persons with lower incomes; 3) the initial income ordering cannot be 
reversed, although two income levels may merge; and, 4) everyone faces 
the same set of prices for goods and services and the same interest 
(discount) rate. They assumed nonsatiation with respect to own income: 
au. 
> 0; i = 1, 2, ..., n. (3.27) 
ô^i 
For the donor to receive utility from a transfer in light of the 
preceding, it must follow that 
9U ÔU 
ÔY^ > 0^ > 0; some j, dY^ = -dY., (3.28) 
^Strictly speaking, the authors assumed that U. held as arguments 
only those Y. such that Y. 3 Y.. 
2 J J 1 
aU^/BY^ corresponds to in the terminology we developed 
while ôU^/ôYj corresponds to 
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where j refers to the recipient of the transfer and i to the donor. 
In the case where all individuals have interdependent utility 
functions the criterion for the recipient to be willing to accept the 
transfer (we assume that he always has the option of refusal) is: 
9U. ÔU. 
^ '^^i' 0.29) 
Given equations 3.27, 3.28 and 3.29 and the assumption of consumer 
sovereignty, the decision as to whether any transfer will be made rests 
with the potential donor. In the case where all recipients have purely 
private utility functions, the transfer would always be accepted. 
The Von Furstenberg and Mueller specification of the utility 
function was specifically chosen so that it would yield the floor level 
of income results. Their utility function was of the Cobb-Douglas form: 
u. = Y tt (^) ; 1 = 1, ..., n, (3.30) 
j=i 1 
or 
i-1 
U = log U ' = (a-(i-l)b') log Y + b' S log Y (3.31) 
1 i=i J 
where individual 1 had the lowest income and individual N the highest. 
If we set the total derivative of this function equal to zero and assume 
that the appropriate second order conditions hold, then for individual 
I to maximize his utility the following must hold: 
dY + ~ dY + ... + dY ^ -(a-(i-l)b') (3.32) 
12 1-1 1 ^ 
Generally we would assume that 
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dY + dY + ... + Y— dY = -<a-(i-l)b') (3.33) 
1 ^ 2 ^ 1-1 1 ^ 
for individual I to maximize his utility. However, it may be that the 
weighted income of all other individuals (b'/Y^) are already so small 
that individual I does not desire to make a transfer to any of them. 
In fact, his utility would increase if any other individual transferred 
money to him. We assume, of course, that individual I cannot force any 
recipient to transfer money to him. 
Under a voluntary transfer system, if the left hand side of equation 
3.33 is initially greater than the right hand side, then individual I 
will transfer money to individual 1, the Individual with the lowest in­
come level, until I's income is equal to individual 2's income. At that 
point, individual I will transfer money in equal amounts to both indi­
viduals 1 and 2. Individual I will proceed in this manner to raise the 
income floor until the right hand side of equation 3.33 is just equal to 
the left hand side. 
The income floor nature of individual I's transfers is a direct 
result of the assumption that the coefficient b' (a preference weighting) 
is the same for all groups that enter individual I's utility function. 
(The coefficients for those income groups with incomes greater than 
are implicitly assumed to be zero by Von Furstenberg and Mueller.) 
This brief analysis assumes that only individual I is making trans­
fers. If some other individual makes transfers to one or more individuals 
whose incomes are less than individual I's, then individual I's decision 
calculus will change. He will be receiving benefits from another 
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individual's transfers and he will not be charged for these benefits. 
In this case individual I will have an incentive to become a free rider. 
Both Hochman and Rodgers and Von Furstenberg and Mueller realize this. 
This is why they assume a collective organization with taxing powers as 
the vehicle for redistribution. Once they have set up this collective 
organization the relevant question becomes one of determining proper tax 
shares for various redistributive programs. Since we are currently 
concerned with the case in which there is only one potential donor, we 
shall ignore the possibility of a collective organization at this time. 
If we allow donor preferences to be such that he does not weigh the 
incomes of all other individuals the same, then we can obtain transfer 
results that are not of the income floor variety. In the analysis that 
follows, we will show that the Von Furstenberg and Mueller model is a 
special case of a more general model and that with this more general 
model we can obtain transfer patterns consistent with those presented by 
Hochman and Rodgers. We propose to modify the Von Furstenberg and Mueller 
model as follows. The utility function for the donor will be given by: 
(3.34) 
i=2 n 
or 
N N 
U. = log U ' = (a - Z b.) log Y. + Z b, log Y.. (3.35) 
^ i=2 ^ 1 i=2 1 1 
N 
By letting b = a - S b. we can write 
i=2 ^ 
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N 
U = S b. log Y.. (3.36) 
^ 1=1 ^ 
We will let the utility functions of the N-1 non-donors be: 
a, 
Ui* = Ui (Y.) = 1 = 2, (3.37) 
Taking the logarithm of both sides yields 
= log U^' = a. log Y^; 1 = 2, ..., N. (3.38) 
It Is assumed that: 
Y^ = Y.* + S.; 1=1, ...,N (3.39) 
* 
where Y^ is individual I s initial Income and is individual I s 
net transfer receipt. will be nonnegative for all nondonors. It 
will be negative for individual 1, the donor, if he makes a transfer 
and zero if he does not. 
If we assume second order conditions hold, then a utility TnAvimuTn 
for the donor will occur when the total derivative of 3.36 is set equal 
to zero. 
N b. N 
dU = S (~) dY =0; S dY = 0. (3.40) 
1=1 1 1=1 
The donor's utility will be maximized when the gain in his utility due 
to the increased income of other individuals is just great enough to 
offset the loss in his utility due to his lowered Income. 
We choose to include the income levels of all individuals in our 
model rather than simply the income levels for those individuals whose 
incomes are less than the donor's because this is the more general 
formulation. If we continue to assume that individuals with lower 
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incomes will never make transfers to those with higher incomes, then we 
need only assume that the marginal cost of making such a transfer is 
greater than the marginal benefit. We need not assume that the marginal 
benefit is zero as Von Furstenberg and Mueller assume. However, by 
including all individuals In the utility function, we leave open the 
possibility that we might observe transfers from poorer persons to richer 
persons. 
The b^ are, in effect, preference weights that the donor has for 
individuals with income Y^. In the collective aspects of the model, 
simplicity would dictate that the donor have the same b^ for all persons 
with incomes equal to Y^. If we are looking at the purely voluntary 
aspects of the model this need not be the case. The donor could have 
differing b's for individuals with the same initial level of Income due 
to the fact that 1) some of these individuals belong to his family; 
2) some are his friends; 3) some belong to the same groups (race, sex, 
lodge, religion, business, etc.) that he belongs to or that he admires ; 
4) he is aware of their particular situation. As a matter of fact, the 
b's need not be equal in the collective aspect since a consensus among 
taxpayers may be that, given two groups of individuals with the same low 
income, transfers should be given to that group of individuals who are 
unable to work but not to the group whose members are capable of working 
but choose not to work. Taxpayer preferences and not income levels alone 
will determine who receives transfers and how great these transfers will 
be. 
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We will interpret the preference weights as folic, s. If > 0 
then the donor will receive an increase in utility as recipient I's 
income increases. If < 0 then the donor's utility will increase as 
Individual I's income falls, and, so long as b^ 3 0, the donor will 
never willingly transfer money to individual I. With b^ < 0, we can 
allow for envy or hatred on the part of the donor. If b^ = 0 then 
changes in individual I's income will have no effect on the donor's 
utility level; he will be totally indifferent toward individual I. 
The b^ are assumed constant during the period of analysis. 
It mig)it be assumed that the donor would weight smaller incomes 
more heavily in his utility function (b^^ > b^ for < Y^), but if he 
does not wish to reverse the positions of any two income groups then 
b^ cannot be larger than b^ for Y^ < Y^. If b^ = b^ for Y^ < Y^ then, 
given that transfers to individual I were sufficiently large, Y^ and Y^ 
would eventually merge into one larger income group. If the donor 
desires to strictly maintain the original income ordering, it is neces­
sary that b^ be less that b^ when Y^ is less than Y^. The fact that b^ 
is greater than zero does not indicate that the donor will necessarily 
transfer funds to individual I since the decision to transfer depends 
upon the ratios b^/Y^ and bj,/Yj,. If the latter is greater than the 
former a transfer will occur. If b^/Y^ is greater than b^/Y^ and if Y^ 
is greater than Y^, then the donor can increase his utility by making a 
transfer to individual I even thougjh individual I has the larger income. 
Note that with this model it is not necessary that the lowest income 
individual receive a transfer even though some individual with a higher 
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income does receive a transfer. If b^/Y^ is greater than b^/Yj, bj/Yj 
is greater than b^/Y^ and Y^ is greater than Y^, then the donor will 
transfer money to individual I before he transfers any to individual J 
even though J has the lower income. 
Given a set of N individuals whose utility functions are given by 
equations 3,36 and 3.38 and whose initial levels of income are Y^*, Yg*, 
..., Y^*, then with voluntary transfers the utility maximizing position 
for the donor (individual 1) will occur when 
N b b 
S =1^ dY, = - dY, (3.41) 
i=2 i ^ 1 ^ 
and 
d^Uj < 0. (3.42) 
N 
As long as S (b,/Y,) dY > -(b^ /Y.) dY,, the donor will be able to 
i=2 
increase his utility by transferring income to the individual with the 
largest bj^/Y^^. If b^/Y^ is equal to b^/Y^ and both are greater than 
b^/Y^ and b^/Y^ for all K ^  1, i, j, then the donor will transfer funds 
to both individuals I and J so as to keep b^/Y^ equal to b^/Y^. The 
marginal transfer to individuals I and J will be divided so that the 
individual with the larger b will receive the larger share of the trans­
fer. These shares will not be equal unless b^ is equal to b^. The 
donor will continue making transfers until equation 3.41 holds. In order 
to get the income floor results obtained by Von Furstenberg and Mueller 
it is only necessary that 1) the donor have the same preference weights 
(bj) for all individuals whose initial incomes fall below the desired 
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income floor and that 2) the ratio b^/Y^ for these low income individuals 
be larger than the ratio for higher income groups. In order to get the 
Hochman and Rodgers results of the donor making transfers to each of 
those below him on the income ladder such that the original income order­
ing is maintained, it is first necessary that the ratio b^/Y^ be the 
same for all individuals whose incomes are lower than the donor's. It is 
not necessary that the ratios initially be the same, only that they are 
the same before he finishes making his transfers. Recall it is necessary 
that individuals with larger incomes are given a higher preference wei^t-
ing if the income ordering is to be maintained. Second, it is necessary 
that the ratios be greater for those individuals whose incomes are less 
than the donor's than for those whose incomes are greater than the 
donor's. 
This is a general model in that it allows us to explain various 
types of transfer behavior on the part of the donor. It can not only 
explain income floor type transfers and income differential type trans­
fers, but it can also explain situations in which the donor makes trans­
fers to individuals whose incomes are higher or the same as his own. It 
can explain his making transfers to individuals in one income class, 
while at the same time, he does not make transfers to individuals in a 
lower income class. It can also be used in explaining why he would want 
to make transfers to some individuals in a certain income class while not 
wanting to make transfers to other individuals in that same inccme class. 
We feel that the power this model has for explaining different types of 
94 
transfer behavior makes it superior to other transfer models which have 
been proposed. 
Looking back at equation 3.6, we may ask what changes we would have 
to make in our analysis if the good being transferred exhibited some 
public goods attributes. Suppose that two or more individuals could 
fully benefit from the transfer of the good in question as they might if 
it were a work of art. In this case the condition that is necessary for 
a transfer to be made is not 
where P ^  N is the number of individuals who will benefit from the 
transfer. 
The donor will take into account the benefits his transfer will 
give to all recipients who use the transfer. He will base his decision 
to transfer upon the cost to himself and the joint benefits. The cost 
to the donor may not be very large if the donor himself is a member of 
P, the group of individuals who utilize the transferred good. The fact 
that the donor transfers a good with public goods attributes is no 
reason why he too may not enjoy the benefits of consuming that good after 
the transfer has been made. This consumption before and after a transfer 
could occur, for instance, if an individual donated a work of art to a 
museum and then visited the museum after he had made the donation. 
AU ;^n an an 
] < 0 for some i (3.43) 
but 
(3.44) 
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Also it should be noted that in equation 3.44 we have not multi­
plied the summed term on the left hand side by dX../dX... Since the 
Ij 
good in question is assumed to have public goods attributes when trans­
ferred, we assume that 
dXj^j = -dX^j for all i contained in P. (3.45) 
When the transferred good is public in nature, dX.. is equal to -dX 
p ij 
for all i in P, not - 2 dX. as in equation 3.17 where the good was 
i=2 
a strictly private good. 
We have thus far assumed that both terms of CôU^/ôX„ + • 
must be positive if a transfer is to be made. If they are 
negative for some individual I, then we assume that the donor does not 
like that individual. How will the existence of malevolent feelings 
affect the donor's transfer? When the good transferred is a strictly 
private good, the fact that the donor holds malevolent feelings toward 
one or more individuals will make no difference. He will make his 
transfers, if he makes any at all, to those individuals for whom he has 
benevolent feelings. He will not freely make any transfers to individ­
uals he does not like. 
If the good is a public good, however, the situation changes. If 
the donor is able to limit the number of individuals who are to receive 
his transfer, then he will take into account only the externalities 
caused by this limited number of individuals when he decides whether or 
how much to transfer. These limitations might take the form of specifi­
cations by the donor of who should benefit from the transfer. An example 
of this type of limitation is the Rhodes scholarship. Individuals who 
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receive the scholarship must meet certain qualifications. For years one 
of the qualifications was that the recipient must be of the male sex. 
Whatever his motives, Cecil Rhodes was for years able to exclude women 
from sharing in his transfer. 
The donor might also be able to take advantage of limitations which 
already exist within the society. For example, if a large number of the 
individuals the donor desires as recipients belong to a private club or 
organization, while a small number of individuals he does not desire as 
recipients belong to that same club or organization, then he can trans­
fer the good to the club or organization. Once the transfer has been 
made, the good can be utilized by the many favored and a few disfavored 
members but not by the many disfavored nonmembers. 
When the donor is not able to limit those individuals who will 
benefit from his transfer of a public good, he will sum all the exter­
nalities he faces, benevolent and malevolent. He will not make a 
transfer of the public good unless 
Note that even if the donor holds benevolent feelings toward most of the 
other members of his society, the existence of even one individual toward 
whom he holds strongly malevolent feelings can cause him to not make a 
transfer which he would have made in the absence of that individual. 
Likewise, the existence of one individual toward whom he holds strongly 
benevolent feelings can cause the donor to make a transfer of the public 
(3.46) 
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good even thougji he realizes that he does not like the majority of the 
individuals who will consume this public good. 
Thus in deciding whether he should transfer a good with public 
qualities the transferor must take into account the externalities caused 
by all potential users of this public good. If the negative externalities 
outweigh the positive externalities, he will not make the transfer. If 
the positive externalities outweigh the negative ones then he may make 
the transfer if equation 3.46 holds. If he is able to consume some of 
the public good after he has transferred it, then his loss in utility 
from making the transfer will probably be small. This will increase the 
probability that he will make the transfer. If he is able to impose 
constraints on who can use the public good, then he will be able to 
eliminate all or some of the negative externalities caused by the consump­
tion of the good by the "wrong" individuals. The ability to make limita­
tions as to who can utilize the public good will also increase the likeli­
hood that the transfer is made. 
When there are more than two individuals in society exchange can 
take place between an individual who will receive or give a transfer and 
one who will not. What effect will such an exchange have on the number 
of transfers and on the level of transfers which take place? The answer 
is dependent upon the timing of exchanges vis-a-vis transfers. The 
number and level of transfers will generally be greater if they occur 
before rather than after exchange has taken place. 
Insofar as the interdependency in the donor's utility function is 
caused wholly or partially by "utility" externalities, exchange will cause 
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the level of transfers to fall. An individual will only enter into an 
exchange if the exchange leaves him no worse off. Generally the individ­
ual will expect to be better off. If exchange increases his utility 
level, the marginal benefits available to the potential donor from 
making the transfer will fall. This will decrease the optimal size of 
the donor's transfer and may even eliminate the transfer all together. 
If the interdependency is caused wholly or partially by a "goods" 
externality, then the direction of trade for that good will determine 
whether the incentive to transfer increases or decreases. If the "goods" 
externality is the result of the recipient's low possession of that good, 
then he may try to get more of that good through exchange. That is, the 
recipient's own marginal utility for the good might be relatively high. 
If he does increase his holdings of the good throu^ exchange, there 
will be less incentive for the donor to transfer that good. If the 
potential recipient trades away the relevant good during exchange, then 
the chances for a transfer of that good will be increased. 
If both types of externality are present and the recipient exchanges 
other goods for the relevant good, then the donor's marginal benefit from 
making the transfer will fall. If he trades away the relevant good the 
change in the donor's marginal benefit is indeterminate since 
will fall due to the recipient's (individual 2's) increased utility level 
and both and will rise due to the recipient's lower 
holdings of that good. 
Suppose the donor also engages in pre-transfer exchange. His 
decision to transfer is based upon marginal benefit * 
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aUg/3Xg^) minus marginal cost . If his marginal cost for a good 
is low, he will probably trade away some of that good during exchange. 
This will raise his marginal utility for that good and raise the marginal 
cost of making the transfer. Thus, if he trades the relevant good away, 
he will reduce his incentive to transfer. If he trades for the relevant 
good, then the marginal cost of his transfer will fall, increasing the 
likelihood of a transfer. Whether the donor's desire to make a transfer 
increases or decreases after exchange depends upon what happens to both 
his marginal cost and marginal benefits. Generally we would expect trans­
fers to be reduced or eliminated after exchange but this will not always 
occur. 
If transfers take place before exchange, then the transfer decision 
will be based upon marginal conditions in force after the original dis­
tribution. We know from Chapter II that transfers will not eliminate the 
desire or need for exchange. A Pareto efficient point will not be reached 
through transfers. A question arises. If transfers precede exchanges, 
will the resulting exchanges lead to situations where further transfers 
are desired? In the two person case the answer is no. The initial trans­
fer leads to a situation where the donor's marginal rate of commodity sub­
stitution (MRCS) is zero, infinity, or undefined. His MRCS Is undefined 
when the donor has reached his bliss point. If the donor has not reached 
his bliss point, exchange will occur until the contract curve is reached. 
In the two person case, post-transfer exchange will lead to the Pareto 
efficient locus. 
In the many person case this result need not hold. Suppose there 
are three individuals in the society, the donor (individual 1), the 
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recipient (individual 2), and a third individual who does not enter the 
donor's utility function. In the post-transfer situation the donor's 
MRCS will be zero or infinity with respect to the recipient. If the 
donor and recipient trade, the donor must exchange the transferred good 
(good 1) for another good. This will lessen his incentive to make 
further transfers of good 1. 
If the recipient makes exchanges with the third individual, then 
the donor's incentive for making further transfers will depend upon the 
direction of exchange for good 1. When the recipient trades for good 
1, the donor will lose incentive for making further transfers since both 
and will fall. If the recipient trades away 
good 1, then the donor may have increased incentive to make further 
transfers. His incentive will increase if rises more rapidly 
than ' aUg/S*?! f&Hs. 
If the donor makes exchanges with the third individual his MRCS 
is no longer zero or infinity. Recall that the donor's MRCS for two 
goods is: 
BU. ÔU. au. ÔU, dX.. 
i— y. r i— ^  à é—l éÀ 
'•^^1 an, a:,, J dx,, 
If the donor and the nonrecipient engage in exchange, dX^^^ = 0 (i = 1, 2) 
so that the terms in brackets fall out. This means that lAen the donor 
trades with the nonrecipient he is acting as an economically selfish 
individual. If he trades for the transferred good will fall. 
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lowering the costs of making further transfers of that good to the 
recipient. If he trades away good 1, will rise, increasing 
transfer costs. The donor will not have an incentive for making further 
transfers of good 1 if he trades away that good during the exchange 
process and the recipient trades for that good. Any other exchange 
pattern (both trade for the good, both trade it away, or the donor 
trades for the good and the recipient trades it away) may lead to incen­
tives for further transfer of good 1. It should be noted that post-
transfer exchange may lead to situations in which the transfer of goods 
not previously transferred becomes desirable. 
In this section we have looked at a situation in which there is one 
donor and N-1 potential recipients. We have found that the donor's 
behavior will depend upon the nature of the good being transferred. If 
the good Is a strictly private good, then the donor will act as in the 
two person case. If there is one individual toward whom the donor is so 
benevolent that a transfer of some units of the good to that individual 
increases the donor's utility, the donor will transfer the good to that 
individual. The donor will continue transferring the good in question 
until the loss in his utility caused by the reduction in his consumption 
of that good is just equal to the Increase in his utility caused by the 
recipient's Increased consumption of that good. His transfer will go to 
only one Individual unless the increase in his utility caused by this 
recipient's consumption of the last unit of the good was equal to or less 
than the increase he could obtain by transferring the next unit of the 
good to another recipient. He will continue to transfer to the two or 
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more recipients until the marginal cost of his transfer equals the 
marginal benefits. 
If the good to be transferred is a public good, then the transfer 
decision will depend in part upon the donor's ability to exclude undesir­
able Individuals from consuming the good. In any case, the donor will 
sum the "goods" and "utility" externalities caused by all the potential 
recipients of the public good and will compare this sum with the cost of 
making the transfer. If all externalities are benevolent, the donor 
will have no reason to limit those who can receive his transfer. If some 
are malevolent externalities, however, limiting the transfer to those 
individuals who exert only benevolent externalities on the donor will 
increase the chances of the transfer being made. 
We also found that when Interdependent utility functions are present 
the system will not necessarily reach an equilibrium after one round of 
transfer-exchange or exchange-transfer. Transfers necessarily lead to a 
situation where further exchange is desirable. Exchange, while generally 
dampening the incentive for transfers, will occasionally Increase the 
desire for further transfers. 
Several Donors 
In this section we make the same basic assumptions as in the last 
section. The notable difference is that there are now K > 1 potential 
donors Instead of one. All potential donors are assumed to have the same 
type of interdependent utility function as that given in equation 3.1. 
The utility function for all nonpotential donors is given by equation 3.2. 
Our assumptions concerning fixed quantities of goods per period of time. 
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rationality of consumers, nonappropriatlon, and costless exchanges and 
transfers remain in effect. We will assume that all relevant second 
order conditions are always satisfied. We will also henceforth assume 
that when a potential donor is in a region of possible charity with 
respect to a certain good and a certain potential recipient he will 
freely make a transfer of the appropriate amount of the good in question 
to the recipient individual. This assumption is made so that we do not 
have to continually remind the reader that in a region of possible 
charity the donor will either make a free transfer of the good or offer 
that good to the recipient at terms of trade better than those available 
on the market. 
We will look at seven different models vtien analyzing the case of 
several donors. We will move from thé simplest case in which the recipi­
ents of each donor are not potential recipients of other donors to the 
most cong»lex case in which every individual in the society, donors and 
recipients alike, has an interdependent utility function. 
Case I: Mutually exclusive recipients 
In this first case it is assumed that there are K > 1 donors and 
N-K potential recipients. These N-K potential recipients are divided 
into K subsets such that each donor has a separate and distinct subset 
of recipients. Thus there are K groups or tribes, each with its own 
benefactor or patron. Each benefactor will independently decide whether 
he should make a transfer to his recipients. He will follow the proce­
dure outlined in the first section of this chapter in determining who 
should receive transfers. Each benefactor will make transfers to all 
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of his potential recipients, to a subset of them, or to none of them 
depending upon the strengths of the externalities affecting him and the 
type of good being transferred. Since we have already discussed the 
major points of this case in the last section we will proceed to case II. 
Case II: Conmon recipients 
In this second case we again assume that there are K potential 
donors and N-K potential recipients. While the welfare and consumption 
levels of some potential recipients may be of concern to only one donor, 
this is not true of every recipient in the society. We assume that there 
are some potential recipients whose consunq>tion and welfare levels impose 
externalities on two or more potential donors. In this subsection we 
will study the effects that conmon recipients will have on the transfer 
behavior of two or more donor individuals. 
For simplicity we will work with a model in which there are only 
three individuals. Two have interdependent utility functions and are 
potential donors. The third has a strictly private utility function 
but enters the utility function of each potential donor. Neither poten­
tial donor enters the utility function of the other potential donor. 
The utility functions of the three Individuals will look as follows: 
Uj . UjCXj, X3; U3), 
Uj = UjCXj, X3; U3). (3.49) 
0.48) 
and 
Uj'UjCXj), (3.50) 
where is the consumption bundle for the i'^ individual (1 = 1, 2, 3). 
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The first order conditions for utility maximization are: 
(3.51) 
dU^ = 0 
'2 = ° 8^'«3 ixj ^  
aUg aug 
(3.52) 
and 
All 
dU, =0 dX. (3.53) 
We have already assumed that the second order conditions for utility 
maximization are met. 
If both donors are malevolent toward individual 3 no problems arise. 
Neither potential donor will make a transfer to individual 3 and, since 
we have assumed nonappropriatlon, neither will be able to increase his 
utility by taking goods fr<S2 individual 3. 
When one potential donor, say individual 1, holds malevolent feelings 
toward the potential recipient and the other has benevolent feelings 
strong enough to cause a transfer, the transfer will be made. Individual 
1 may try to persuade individual 2 to reduce his transfers to the 
recipient, but individual 2 will ignore this request since the level of 
individual I's utility is of no concern to him. Individual 1 cannot 
bribe individual 2 to reduce his transfer since any such bribe will 
increase individual 2's bundle of goods. This will lower Individual 2's 
marginal utility from consumption and Increase his desire to make trans­
fers to individual 3. Individual 1 cannot threaten individual 2 since 
we have assumed nonapproprlatlon which rules out lowering another 
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individual's utility level throu^ forceful actions. Thus if individual 
2 desires to make a transfer to individual 3 he will make the transfer 
without concern for the negative effects this transfer causes individual 
1. Individual 1 will have to live with the transfer and with a lowered 
level of utility. 
The above situation presents some interesting insights into the 
actions and behavior of individuals. When all utility functions are 
strictly private, the exchange of goods between two individuals will not 
affect the utility levels of any other individual. Since no one is made 
worse off by the exchange, the post-exchange distribution of goods must 
be Pare to better than the pre-exchange distribution. When utility func­
tions are Interdependent and some of the externalities are malevolent, 
all transfers and/or exchanges may not lead to Pareto better situations. 
The two Individuals Involved In the transfer or exchange will be better 
off, but other Individuals may be made worse off. 
The individuals who would be made worse off by a transfer have an 
incentive to try to stop the transfer or exchange or to at least try to 
reduce the amount transferred or exchanged. Thus, individuals who meddle 
in situations which do not seem to concern them may. In fact, be very 
concerned. Their Involvement may be very rational from an economic 
standpoint. 
If enough individuals experience negative externalities from the 
consumption or welfare levels of other individuals then it may be possible 
that no move from the initial distribution of goods will be a Pareto 
better move. It may be possible that any transfer or any exchange will 
make at least one individual worse off. In this case the Pareto 
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criterion is no longer useful for determining society's preferred dis­
tributions of goods. Some method capable of making interpersonal utility 
comparisons is needed. 
An interesting situation arises when both individuals 1 and 2 have 
benevolent feelings for individual 3. Suppose that the external effects 
are so strong that both potential donors desire to make a transfer to 
individual 3. If each acted without regard to the actions of the other, 
the resulting total transfer to individual 3 migjkt be larger than either 
of the donors desired. It certainly would be larger than the transfer 
each desired to make (and made) when he acted alone. This larger than 
desired transfer is caused by the fact that each donor acts as if he is 
the only transferor whereas he is really one of several transferors. 
That is, each acts as if dX^ = - dX^^ (i = 1, 2) whereas dX^ is really 
equal to - (dX^ + dXg). 
We have assumed that the potential donors have some degree of 
accurate knowledge of the recipient's holdings of goods and of how 
changes in these holdings affect the recipient's utility levels. With 
such knowledge it would not be long before each donor realized that the 
recipient was receiving transfers from other donor individuals. The 
knowledge that a recipient is receiving transfers from more than one 
source may influence some of the donors to become free riders. That is, 
they will stop their own transfers to the recipient with the knowledge 
that other donors will continue to make transfers. The free riders will 
receive increases in their utility levels since the recipient will be 
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better off, but this increased utility will have cost them nothing since 
they made no transfers themselves. 
Suppose individual 1 in our model attempts to free ride. Given 
that individual 2 continues his transfers to individual 3, the utility 
levels of all three individuals will increase. Individual 3's utility 
will increase since he has a larger bundle of goods. Individual 2's 
utility will increase since he has made transfers until 
ÔU, 9U, 3U 
âx ; -  =  (3 .54)  
Individual I's utility will increase even though he made no transfer 
since he is benevolent toward individual 3 and both 3's holdings of 
goods and his utility have increased due to the transfer from individual 
2. Note that if individual 2's transfers are not sufficient to cause 
• aUg/ôXg] to fall below ôU^/ôX^, then individual 1 
will make additional transfers to individual 3 until these two terms 
are equal. 
Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of individual I's situa­
tion. The horizontal axis measures the amount transferred by individual 
1 and/or to individual 3. The vertical axis measures individual I's 
gains or losses in marginal utility. The MC curve is individual I's 
marginal cost of making a transfer and is equal to in equation 
3.51. The MB curve measures the marginal benefits received by individual 
1 when individual 3 receives a transfer. This is the 
* BUg/SXg] term in equation 3.51. If individual 1 makes the only trans­
fer to individual 3, he will transfer until his marginal benefits equal 
Marginal utility 
Amount transferred 
Figure 3.1. A donor's marginal cost and marginal benefit from a transfer 
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his marginal costs (point A). Individual 1 will transfer qg units of 
the goods bundle at this optimal transfer point. 
If individual 1 does not make a transfer but Individual 2 does, 
then the increase in individual I's utility will be equal to the relevant 
area under the MB curve. Individual I's utility will be maximized if 
individual 2 transfers q units of the bundle to individual 3 for at 
0 
this point individual I's marginal benefit from further transfer is equal 
to zero. Individual 2 will only transfer until his marginal benefits 
from the transfer are equal to his marginal costs. Assume that 
individual 2's optimal transfer is less than q^. If his optimal transfer 
is greater than or equal to q^ individual 1 will not have the incentive 
to make further transfers to individual 3 since his marginal benefits 
from making the transfer will be no greater than his marginal costs. If 
individual 2's optimal transfer level is less than q^, say q^, then 
individual 1 can increase his utility by making a further transfer, of 
q^, to individual 3. The MB' curve in Figure 3.1 is the marginal benefit 
curve facing individual 1 after individual 2 has transferred q^ units of 
the goods bundle to individual 3. 
It is easy to see from Figure 3.1 that individual I's utility will 
increase most rapidly if he does not contribute to the transfer received 
by individual 3, He will receive the benefits of the transfer but will 
incur none of its costs. As long as Individual 2 transfers at least q^ 
units of the goods bundle to individual 3, individual 1 will have no 
incentive to make further transfers to individual 3. He will become a 
free rider. 
Ill 
One way to overcome the free rider problem is for the two donors 
to jointly administer the transfer. There are two problems which must 
be solved when a joint transfer is made. The first problem is deciding 
on the total size of the transfer. The second is deciding on the 
appropriate shares to be borne by each donor. The Lindahl solution to 
the public goods problem provides a solution to these problems of joint 
transfer [33]. With the Lindahl solution, both donors will end up in a 
post-transfer situation where 
9U ôU ÔU ÔU 
i = 1, 2 and dX^ = -dX^ - dX^. 
In the Lindahl solution it is assumed that there is a continuous 
function which relates an individual's desired size of the total transfer 
with his share of that total transfer. If his share of the transfer is 
zero, then the maximum transfer he desires is the one which sets 
• 3Ug/3X^] equal to zero where i represents this 
particular individual. This amount corresponds to q^ in Figure 3.1. 
When he makes the entire transfer, the maximum transfer he will make is 
the one which sets -[ôU^/^X^ + • âU^/ôX^] equal to ôU^/ôX^^ (i.e., 
q^ in Figure 3.1). This desired transfer will necessarily be smaller 
than the preceding one where he made no contribution to the transfer. 
If the individual's share of the transfer is between zero and one, then 
the desired maximum transfer will be between the two extremes mentioned 
above. As an individual's transfer share is increased, his desired 
maximum transfer decreases. 
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In Figure 3.2 we have drawn individual I's Lindahl curve. The 
vertical axis in Figure 3.2 measures the desired level of transfer while 
the horizontal axis measures the individual's share of the transfer to 
individual 3. This share increases from zero on the left boundary to 
one on the ri^t. The size of individual I's desired transfer when he 
does not contribute to the transfer is g . When he makes the entire 
o 
transfer the size desired is q^. 
Individual I's utility will increase as he moves along the curve 
from qg to q^. There are two reasons for this increase in his utility. 
First, the recipient will receive more goods so individual 1 will receive 
a larger benefit from the transfer. Second, the donor will bear a 
smaller share of the transfer. The size of his transfer may initially 
increase as his share of the total transfer declines. This will cause 
the marginal cost of the transfer to increase. The slope of his Lindahl 
curve will determine whether the size of his transfer will initially 
increase or decrease as his share of the transfer decreases. The steeper 
the slope of the Lindahl curve the more likely the size of his transfer 
will increase before it decreases. In Figure 3.2 the qgO curve shows 
the size of the transfer individual 1 is willing to make given his share 
of the transfer and the size of his desired transfer. Even though the 
marginal cost of his transfer may be increasing his utility will still 
increase since his marginal benefits from the total transfer will 
increase even faster. 
If another donor makes a transfer, to Individual 3, individual I's 
Lindahl curve will fall. If individual 2 made a transfer of q^ as in 
size of 
desired 
transfer 
q 
Shate of transfer for Individual 1 
Figure 3.2, The Llndahl curve 
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Figure 3.1, Individual 1 would just lose the incentive to make a further 
transfer to individual 3, His Llndahl curve would shift down from 
to l,(q^-qj^). He would still be willing to make a joint transfer but 
he will no longer make a transfer alone. 
The transfer by individual 2 will increase individual I's utility. 
Figure 3.3 shows three different utility curves for individual 1. 
Utility is measured on the vertical axis and the size of the transfer to 
individual 3 is measured on the horizontal axis. The solid curve from 
^initial the point A (U^) is individual I's utility curve when 
he is the only one making transfers. His utility is maximized at point 
A (U^) after he transfers qg units of the goods bundle to Individual 3. 
The utility curve from ^^^j^^ial the point B (Ug) is 
individual I's utility curve when he makes no contribution to the trans­
fer. Ug is always above and reaches a maximum at point B when q^ 
units of the goods bundle have been transferred to individual 3. At 
point B individual I's utility level is Vnwrimim' Is the maximum 
level of utility he can achieve through transfers alone. We have drawn 
U„ so that individual I's utility is constant at U if more than 
B '' maximum 
q^ units are transferred, but it would decline after point B if a trans­
fer greater than q^ caused individual 1 to become malevolent toward 
individual 3. Too much of a good thing could be bad for individual 1. 
The thifd curve in Figure 3.3 (U^) represents individual I's utility 
level as he moves along his Llndahl curve. lies below Ug since 
individual 1 is incurring some marginal cost when he shares in a transfer 
of a given size. The greater the marginal cost of making a transfer, 
Individual I's 
utility 
U 
maximum 
U 
free rider 
U 
U 1 . 
initial 
U 
B 
<12 4] Size of transfers 
to individual 3 
Figure 3.3. The donor's utility curves when he makes a transfer alone (U.), when he does not 
share in the cost of the transfer (Ug), and when he shares in a joint transfer (U^). 
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given the marginal benefits, the farther will generally be from U^. 
In Figure 3.4 we have drawn the Lindahl curve for individuals 1 and 
2. Individual I's share of the transfer increases and Individual 2's 
decreases as we move from left to right. If individual 1 makes the 
entire transfer he will make a transfer of size qg whereas individual 2 
desires a transfer of q^. Likewise if individual 2 makes the only trans­
fer he will make a transfer of q^ while individual 1 desires a transfer 
of q^. Point D in Figure 3.4 is the only point where the two individuals 
will agree both on the size of the transfer to be made (q^) and upon the 
share to be borne by each (a for individual 1 and (1-a) for individual 2). 
If a joint transfer is made it will be of size q^. If individual 1 
decides to become a free rider the transfer size will be q^. This is 
the amount individual 2 is willing to transfer to individual 3 when he 
makes the transfer alone. The question at hand is will individual 1 
make a joint transfer with individual 2 or will he become a free rider. 
To find the answer we must look back at Figure 3.3. When Individual 1 
is a free rider, q^ will be transferred and his utility will be 
Ufree rider' individual 1 to be willing to make a joint transfer he 
would have to have a utility level higher than rider' *111 
happen, given his particular Lindahl curve, when the joint transfer is 
greater than q^. Thus q^ in Figure 3.4 must be greater than q^ in 
Figure 3.3 if individual 1 is to willingly share in the transfer to 
individual 3. We assume, of course, that the q^'s (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) 
in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 represent the same quantities of the goods 
bundle. 
size of 
desired 
transfer 
q 
o 
0 Share of transfer for individual 1 > 1 
1 < Share of transfer for individual 2 0 
Figure 3.4. The Llndahl solution 
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Suppose that both potential donors were benevolent toward the 
potential recipient, but that only one of them, say individual 2, faced 
an externality great enough to make him transfer goods to the recipient. 
It may seem that individual 1 would never have an incentive to make a 
transfer since the transfer from individual 2 to individual 3 will further 
reduce the marginal benefit he would get from making a transfer. Thus it 
may seem that individual 1 will always be a free rider. However, it may 
be possible for individual 2 to convince individual 1 to make a joint 
transfer. Individual 1 might agree to the joint transfer if, \Aien his 
transfer share is zero, he desires a greater transfer for the recipient 
than is made by individual 2. This can be seen in figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.5 shows that individual 1 is not willing to make a transfer 
to individual 3 unless his share of that transfer is less than g. He will 
never voluntarily make a transfer if he has to finance it entirely him­
self. In this instance, • ôU^/ôX^] is positive but 
less than Note that is greater than q^. The transfer by 
individual 2 does not set [9U^/BXg + • ôU^/ôX^] equal to zero. 
Thus there must be some size transfer between q^ and q^ where the two 
donors will agree on relative shares. This size transfer is, of course, 
q^. The share for individual 1 is a and the share for individual 2 is 
1 - a. 
Again, the fact that the two potential donors agree on the size and 
shares of a joint transfer does not imply that such a joint transfer will 
take place. The joint transfer will occur only if individual 1 receives 
a greater increase in his utility from making a joint transfer than from 
Size of 
desIred 
transfer 
q 
o 
0 Share of transfer for individual 1 > 1 
1 < Share of transfer for Individual 2 0 
Figure 3.5. The Llndahl solution when one donor refuses to be the sole donor 
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being a free rider. This, as we have seen before, will depend upon the 
values of q^, q^, and the size of given * 
()Ug/5Xg]. In general, if individual 1 is not willing to make a transfer 
on his own, we assume that he will only agree to join in the joint trans­
fer if his share of such a transfer is very small. 
In Figure 3.6 we see a situation in which no joint transfer will be 
made even though individual 1 has benevolent feelings for individual 3. 
The reason no joint transfer will be made is that the externality on 
individual 1, caused by individual 3, will disappear by the time individ­
ual 2 finishes making his transfers. That is, [BU^/aX^ + • 
ôUg/ôXg] will become zero. Individual 1 migjit be willing to bear a share 
of the transfer if his share is less than g but the two individuals will 
never be able to agree on a desired transfer size. 
Suppose the two donors are benevolent toward the recipient but 
neither desires to make a transfer on his own. They will be willing to 
make a joint transfer if their Lindahl curves are similar to those 
depicted in Figure 3.7. The necessary condition for a joint transfer 
to be made in this case is that the Lindahl curves for the two individ­
uals cross at a positive desired transfer size. Figure 3.7 shows a 
transfer of q^. Since neither potential donor would make a transfer when 
acting along neither can be a free rider. Since they can both increase 
their utility by making a joint transfer and since we have assumed that 
they are both rational consumers, both will join in making the joint 
transfer. 
Size of 
desired 
transfer 
Share of transfer for individual 1 0 > 1 
1 < Share of transfer for individual 2 — —---- 0 
Figure 3.6. A situation where no Joint transfer will occur 
Size of 
desired 
transfer 
Share of transfer for individual 1 
Share of transfer for individual 2 
Figure 3.7. The situation where a joint transfer will be made even though neither donor would 
make the transfer alone 
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This type of consumer behavior may be one rationale for the forma­
tion of charitable organizations. Individuals who would not make a 
transfer to a person or organization if they were the only ones making 
the transfers might make a contribution if they knew that this contribu­
tion was just a small portion of the total transfer. 
The free rider problem will probably be greater when there are many 
potential donors than when there are only a few.^ In the first place 
there will be some individuals whose situation is similar to that 
depicted for individual 1 in Figure 3.6. These individuals might be 
willing to share in a transfer but not in the amount proposed by others. 
In the second place, the greater number of potential donors means there 
will be a greater number whose utility increases if they participate in 
a joint transfer but whose utility does not increase as much as it does 
when they are free riders. On the other hand, the greater number of 
potential donors would indicate that each would have a small share of a 
large transfer. The smaller an Individual's share and the larger the 
total transfer the greater will be the incentive to join in the joint 
transfer. The final decision on whether or not a potential donor will 
assist in the joint transfer will depend on how much his utility 
increases when he joins the group versus how much it increases when he 
is a free rider. 
or an excellent treatise on this point see Mancur Olsen [40]. 
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It has been argued that in small sized groups social pressure will 
help reduce the free rider problem [24; 26; 28]. As the size of the 
group increases, social pressure becanes less powerful in dealing with 
free riders. This is a valid argument and there is some evidence which 
supports it [34]. Social pressure increases the costs of certain actions 
or certain nonactions. In this case it increases the costs of being a 
free rider. Social pressure based on threats or penalties is a form of 
appropriation and we have assumed nonappropriation. Therefore, we shall 
assume away this type of social pressure for the remainder of the paper. 
The potential free rider problem has been cited by some authors as 
a reason why transfers should be funneled through a governmental agency 
[8; 22; 38; 49]. The difference between this type of collective action 
and the voluntary collective action described earlier is that the govern­
ment has the power of taxation. (Forget for the moment that taxation is 
probably the ultimate form of appropriation.) With public collectiviza­
tion, the government can supposedly determine each individual's transfer 
share and then tax the individual to collect those shares. The problem 
is in deciding what each individual's transfer share (tax) ou^t to be. 
In theory the government should use the benefit principle when 
determining an individual's taxes. The benefit principle is based on 
the fact that individuals receive some marginal benefit from the output 
of a given amount of public goods. We are including redistribution in 
the public goods category. If the government could determine the true 
marginal benefits that redistribution gives each individual it could tax 
them accordingly. With perfect knowledge the government could adjust the 
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output of public goods in such a way that the taxes which were collected 
on the basis of marginal benefits were just sufficient to cover the costs 
of that 'particular bundle of public goods. In other words, the argument 
is that public collectivization will give us the Lindahl solution. Thus, 
in theory, the moving of redistribution from the private sector to the 
public sector could solve the free rider problem because each person 
could be taxed according to the marginal benefits he received from redis­
tribution. In reality taxpayers will not reveal their true preferences 
and the government has no practical way of divining what these true 
preferences are. We move from the free rider problem of the private 
sector to the preference revelation problem of the public sector. 
We question whether the movement of redistribution to the public 
sector increases the chances of obtaining a Pareto optimum. If prefer­
ences are not accurately revealed some individuals will not be taxed 
properly. If any individual is overtaxed he can end up with a level of 
utility lower than his initial utility level. If even one person is 
made worse off by the tax-transfer scheme of the governmental agency then 
we cannot automatically say that the tax-transfer scheme has led society 
to a preferred position. As long as an individual has an opportunity to 
make nontax transfers, undertaxation will not present the same type of 
problem. 
In the voluntary situation the movement from the pre-transfer dis­
tribution to the post-transfer distribution will usually be a Pareto 
better move if all externalities are benevolent even when free riders are 
present (see Case IV). However, if some externalities are malevolent 
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then we cannot be sure that the redistribution of goods leads to a 
Pareto better situation. Recall our example of two donors, one with 
benevolent externalities and one with malevolent. When the donor with 
the benevolent feelings makes a transfer to the recipient, the other 
(potential) donor is made worse off. Since the utility levels of two 
individuals have increased and that of one decreased, we are unable to 
say that the transfer has moved the three individuals to a better posi­
tion. 
Suppose malevolent externalities are present and transfers are 
collectivized in the public sector. Then compensation will be paid to 
those harmed by the transfer, if the government desires that society 
reach a Pareto better position. The payment of condensation means that 
all taxes collected will not go to those the taxpayers desire to help. 
Some will go to other potential taxpayers. Compensation will reduce the 
incentives individuals have for revealing their true preferences. They 
may understate their true desires for transfers in the hopes of receiv­
ing compensation or reducing their tax burden. 
Payment of compensation also means that those who do pay taxes will 
pay lower taxes even if they have truthfully revealed their preferences 
concerning transfers. The reason for this is easy to see. With no 
compensation the optimal tax will be the one which sets 
ÔU ôu- ôu au. 
âx; - [gx; + âô; cas = 4%! = -d%3- «.56) 
When compensation is paid dX^ > -dX^; the tax paid is greater than the 
transfer to the desired recipients. Thus, if the same tax as in 
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equation 3.56 is paid: 
ÔU. au au au dx 
âÊ; + âû; ââ;] dx;: > -dx,. (3.57) 
The taxpayer's utility will increase if his taxes are reduced. 
The public solution may be no solution if the amount of compensation 
claimed exceeds the amount of taxes paid. If the government does not 
conq)ensate those harmed by the transfer, then reducing the free rider 
problem may move society to a Pareto worse position. Public collectivi­
zation is not necessarily better than private collectivization, the free 
rider problem not withstanding. Since we have assumed nonappropriation 
and since taxation is obviously a form of appropriation, we will no 
longer concern ourselves with the public collectivization of redistribu­
tion. 
Case III: Nested donors with mutually 
exclusive nondonor recipients 
In case III we assume that some donors are potential recipients of 
other donors. It is assumed that these donor-recipients are nested in 
such a manner that transfers between donors can flow in only one direc­
tion. In other words, in this case (and in the next) there is no 
possibility of reciprocal transfers between any two donors. We assume 
in case III that all nondonor recipients of each donor form mutually 
exclusive sets. Case III demands our attention since It shows that 
voluntary transfers can be motivated by malice as well as by kindness. 
We will use a simple four person model in our analysis of case III. 
Individuals 1 and 2 are designated potential donors and individuals 2, 3 
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and 4 potential recipients. The utility functions for each individual 
are: 
Ui = U^(X^, Xg, X3; U^, U3), (3.58) 
Ug = UgCXg, X^; U^), (3.59) 
(3.60) 
and 
«4 - «4«4)' 
Their first order condition for utility maximization are: 
au 9u au ôu 
dUi = o=^dXi + C—] dXg 
Bu. âu au. au. au, au, au, 
+ + 3^ âig] ^ 3 + ^4' (3-*:) 
au 80 an an 
au, 
».«4) 
and 
au, 
dU^ = 0 = ^  dX^. (3.65) 
Individuals 3 and 4 will never make transfers since they are 
economically selfish. Individual 2 will transfer only to individual 4, 
if he makes any transfers at all. Individual 1 mi^t make transfers to 
any or all of individuals 2, 3, and 4. Individual 4 does not enter 
directly into individual I's utility function, but he does enter 
individual 2*8. Since individual 1 is concerned with Individual 2's 
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welfare and individual 2 is concerned with individual 4's welfare, 
individual 4's welfare will indirectly enter individual I's utility 
function. 
A donor will make a transfer to a potential recipient if the bene­
fits of making the transfer outweigh the costs. Individual I's trans­
fers to individual 3 and individual 2's transfers to individual 4 cause 
no problems. These transfers will follow from the procedure outlined in 
the first section of this chapter. What is of interest here is how 
individual I's transfers to individual 2 will affect individual 2's 
transfers to individual 4; how individual 2's transfers to individual 4 
will affect individual I's transfers to individual 2; under what circum­
stances individual 1 will make a transfer directly to individual 4 
without making a transfer to individual 2; and, under what circumstances 
individual 1 will make simultaneous transfers to both individual 2 and 
individual 4. 
When individual 1 makes a transfer to individual 2, individual 2 
will have an increased incentive for making a transfer to individual 4 
assuming all externalities are benevolent. Individual I's transfer to 
individual 2 will increase 2's holdings of goods. The Increase in his 
holdings of goods will lower his marginal utility from holding goods 
(BU2AX2 falls) which lowers his cost af making transfers. Since the 
benefits of making a transfer to individual 4 have not changed and his 
costs have fallen, individual 2's incentive for making the transfer 
will have Increased. If individual 2 dislikes individual 4 then. 
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obviously, individual I's transfers to individual 2 will have no effect 
upon individual 2's transfers to individual 4. 
How will individual 2's transfers to individual 4 affect individual 
I's transfers to individual 2? Looking back at equation 3.62 we see that 
individual I's decision to make a transfer to individual 2 will depend 
upon the values of the cost of making the transfer, and 
• BUg/aXg], the benefits from making the transfer. 
Individual 2's transfer to individual 4 will not affect but it 
will affect the term in brackets. The transfer by individual 2 will 
raise individual 2's utility which will cause to fall since we 
2 2 
have assumed ô negative. On the other hand, the transfer 
has lowered individual 2's holdings of goods which will increase both 
aU^/ôX2 and The effect on [aU^/aX^ + is 
indeterminate since 3U^/9Xg has increased and * BU^/aX^ may have 
increased or decreased. If individual 1 is impressed with individual 2's 
benevolent behavior then we would probably be safe in assuming that 
[3U^/BX^ + has increased as a result of individual 2's 
transfers. This would increase individual I's incentive to make a trans­
fer to individual 2. 
There are two instances when individual 1 will transfer directly to 
individual 4 without making a transfer to individual 2. If all exter­
nalities are benevolent then individual 1 will make a transfer directly 
to individual 4 without transferring to individual 2 Wien 
ÔU- au, au au, au. au. au. 
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Note that for this to occur individual 2 must also be willing to make a 
transfer to individual 4. This can be easily seen if we rewrite 
equation 3.66 as 
au, ÔU. au. au. au, au, 
The term in parentheses within the brackets Is similar to equation 3.63 
when dX^ = -dX^. If the term in parentheses is equal to zero then 
individual 2 will be maximizing his utility given his bundle of goods 
and the externalities he faces. However, if all externalities are 
benevolent as we have assumed, the term in brackets in equation 3.67 
will be greater than zero when the term in parentheses is equal to zero. 
This violates equation 3.67. Equation 3.67 will hold only when the term 
in parentheses is negative. Thus individual 1 will only make transfers 
to individual 4 when Individual 2 is also willing to make a transfer to 
individual 4. 
If individual 2 does make a transfer to individual 4, the term in 
parentheses in equation 3.67 will rapidly approach zero. This will 
limit individual I's transfers to individual 4. If individual 2 decides 
to become a free rider, then individual I's transfers to individual 4 
will also cause the term in parentheses to approach zero. It will not 
reach zero, however, since the presence of the positive au^/ax^ term 
means individual 1 will stop transferring exclusively to individual 4 
before individual 2's desire to make a transfer to individual 4 is 
eliminated. (Note that no matter who transfers to individual 4, the 
aU^/aUg term in equation 3.67 will fall as individual 2's utility in­
creases . ) 
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Individual 1 will transfer to individual 4 without transferring to 
individual 2 only as long as the inequality in equation 3.67 holds. When 
the inequality in 3.67 becomes an equality, individual 1 will make trans­
fers to both individuals 2 and 4 until the marginal cost of such trans­
fers is just equal to the marginal benefits. At this point individual 2 
will desire to make further transfers to individual 4 since the exis­
tence of a positive dU^/dX^ in equation 3.67 implies that the term in 
parentheses is negative. This transfer by individual 2 may cause 
individual 1 to make an additional transfer to him. 
Since individual 4's welfare enters individual I's utility function 
indirectly we generally expect the same post-transfer distribution of 
goods to result if individual 1 does not make a transfer to individual 
4 but rather makes his transfer to individual 2 and lets individual 2 
make a transfer to individual 4. However, this holds only when individual 
2's transfer does not lower individual I's incentive to make further 
transfers to individual 2. That is, must 
not fall as a result of individual 2's transfer to individual 4. If 
this term does fall, then individual 1 will transfer fewer units of the 
goods bundle when he makes several incremental transfers to individual 2 
and lets Individual 2 make all the transfers to individual 4. 
Individual 1 might also be motivated to make a transfer to 
individual 4 without making a transfer to individual 2 when all exter­
nalities are malevolent. In this instance individual 1 may be able to 
increase his own utility by lowering that of individual 2, The assump­
tion of nonappropriation precludes lowering individual 2's utility by 
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taking some of his goods, but it does not prevent lowering his utility 
by increasing the utility levels of those he dislikes. Individual 1 
will make the transfer if the benefits of the transfer exceed the costs; 
that is, if 
ôu au au au au 
(3.68) 
where aU^/aUg, aUg/au^, and au^/ax^ are ail negative. 
We might generally expect to find transfers motivated by malevolent 
feelings only when individual 1 has an extreme dislike for individual 2 
or individual 2 has an extreme dislike for individual 4. Certainly 
hatred can precipitate such transfers, but it is not a necessary ingredi­
ent. Many harmless actions whose purpose is to tease or annoy some 
individual would be included as malevolently motivated transfers. An 
example of this type of behavior would be one adolescent confiding to 
his friend, "1 like being nice. It makes my parents wonder what I'm up 
to." The motivation for many spiteful actions which are directed by 
one Individual towards another may be explained by malevolent externali­
ties in interdependent utility functions. 
Case III has shown that transfers may be motivated by malevolent 
externalities. It has also shown how transfers are affected when some 
donors are the recipients of other donors. 
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Case IV; Nested donors with joint 
nondonor recipients 
Case IV is a combination of cases II and III. It is assumed in 
case IV that some donors are the recipients of other donors. These 
donor-recipients are nested as in case III. It is also assumed that a 
donor and a donor-recipient may have common potential recipients. These 
conmon potential recipients may or may not be other potential donors. 
This case is important since it shows that the feelings of the donor-
recipient will influence the size of his donor's transfers to the conmon 
recipient. This influence is a form of social pressure. 
We will use a three person, two donor model to study this case. 
The utility functions of the three individuals are: 
= U^(X^, Xg, X3; Ug, U3), (3.69) 
(3.70) 
and 
D3 - 0,(X,). (3.71) 
The first order conditions for utility maximization are: 
r—- H —- 4 (—- + —- —"1 dX_ 
•-9X3 BU3 9X3 BUg 9^X3 BUg 3X3^ -1 **3 
(3.72) 
(3.73) 
and 
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®3 ' ° ^ ®3-
The second order conditions for utility maximization are assumed to hold. 
Before we analyze this three person model, we will generalize the 
influence individual 2 has on individual I's transfers to individual 3. 
If both externalities concerning individual 2 are of the same type (i.e., 
the feelings individual 1 has for individual 2 and those individual 2 has 
for individual 3 are either both benevolent or both malevolent), then 
individual 1 will have a greater incentive to make a transfer to 
individual 3 than when individual 2 did not enter his utility function. 
If the externalities concerning individual 2 are of different types, 
then individual 1 will have a lesser Incentive to make a transfer to 
individual 3. 
To see this, look at Figure 3.8. The curve q^qg is individual I's 
Llndahl curve when individual 2 does not enter his utility function. 
When both externalities concerning individual 2 are either benevolent or 
malevolent, then individual I's Llndahl curve will shift up to q^'qg'. 
When one externality concerning individual 2 is benevolent and the other 
is malevolent, then the Llndahl curve will shift down to 
These shifts are caused by individual I's concern for individual 2's 
feelings. 
If all externalities In our three person model are malevolent, the 
only transfer that might be made is one from individual 1 to individual 
3. If we set dX^ = -dX^ in equation 3.72 and set dX^ = 0 in this same 
equation, then individual 1 will make a transfer to individual 3 whenever 
size of 
desired 
transfer 
I q 
o 
• I 
o 
0 Share of transfer for Individual 1 •> 1 
Figure 3.8. Â donor's Llndahl curve when his transfers are Influenced by another donor 
137 
ôu au, ôu, ôu- au, au. au. au. 
—- - —- - —- —— - —- r—- + —— ——1 <0 (3 75) 
ax^ aXg au^ ax^ au^ "-ax^ au^ 
The positive terms in equation 3.75 are aU^/aX^ and aU^/aX^. Ail other 
terms are negative. Individual 1 will only make the transfer when his 
marginal costs, comprised of his loss of utility due to his own lowered 
consumption and the increase in individual 3's consumaition and welfare 
levels, are less than his marginal benefits. These marginal benefits 
are the increase in his utility caused by individual 2's lowered utility 
level. We would not expect transfers motivated by malevolent feelings to 
take place unless these negative feelings are extremely strong. 
In terms of Figure 3.8, individual I's Lindahl curve for a transfer 
to individual 3 originally coincides with the horizontal axis. "Origin­
ally" in this case means individual 2 does not exert externalities on 
individual I's utility function. When individual 2 enters individual 
I's utility function, the Lindahl curve may shift upward. Whether it 
shifts up or not will depend upon the strength of the externalities con­
cerning individual 2 vis-a-vis the strength of individual I's negative 
feelings for individual 3. That is, the absolute value of 
au^/aUgCaUg/aXg + au^/au^ • au^/ax^] must be greater than [au^/ax^ 
+ aU^/aUg • aU^/aXg] if individual I's Lindahl curve is to shift upward. 
The horizontal axis is individual 2's Lindahl curve. 
Suppose that individual 1 likes individual 3 but dislikes individual 
2 and that individual 2 dislikes individual 3. In this situation 
individual I's incentive for making a transfer to individual 3 will be 
greater than it would be if individual 1 did not care about individual 
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2's feelings. The positive terms in equation 3.75 are now 
ôUj^/ôX^, and ôU^/ôX^. Individual 1 will receive an increase 
in his utility both from the increases in individual 3's utility level 
and goods holdings and frcm the decrease in individual 2's utility level. 
In this case individual I's "original" Lindahl curve is above at least a 
part of the horizontal axis. The malevolent externalities in those terms 
concerning individual 2 will shift the Lindahl curve upward. There is 
no guarantee that this new, higher Lindahl curve will insure individual 
I's willingness to make a unilateral transfer to individual 3. 
If both donors have benevolent feelings for individual 3 but 
individual 1 does not like individual 2, we have a situation similar to 
that presented in case II. The fact that individual 2 receives an in­
crease in his utility level when individual 3 becomes better off will 
dampen the utility individual 1 receives from individual 3's good 
fortune. Individual 1 might still make a transfer to individual 3 but 
he will not transfer as much as he would if he did not dislike individual 
2. In this case individual I's Lindahl curve will shift down from its 
"original" position. 
If individual 1 likes individual 2 but both donors dislike 
individual 3, then the only transfer that might take place is one from 
individual 1 to individual 2. Individual 1 will make the transfer if his 
marginal costs from doing so are less than the marginal benefits he 
receives. Likewise, if individual 1 dislikes both individuals 2 and 3 
and individual 2 likes individual 3, then individual 1 will never make a 
transfer although individual 2 might make one to individual 3. 
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When individual 1 likes both of the other individuals but individual 
2 does not like individual 3, individual 2's dislike will reduce the 
desire individual 1 has for making a transfer to individual 3. This 
does not mean individual 1 will refuse to make a transfer to individual 
3, only that the transfer that is made will be smaller than it otherwise 
would have been. Individual 2's dislike for individual 3 will not 
affect individual I's transfers to individual 2. 
Suppose that individual 1 has benevolent feelings for individual 2 
and malevolent feelings for individual 3 and that individual 2 has 
benevolent feelings for individual 3. If the externality is large 
enough ; individual 2 will make a transfer to individual 3. Individual 1 
might also make a transfer to Individual 3. Look at equation 3.75. If 
the term is larger than 
- then individual 1 will be willing to make 
a transfer to individual 3. This may explain the "I didn't really want 
to do it, but it meant so much to Mr. Smith" actions that we all 
occasionally perform. The benefits to individual 2 are so large that 
individual 1 will make the transfer to individual 3 even though he does 
not like individual 3. Note that it is not necessary that individual 2 
be willing to make a transfer to individual 3 for the above argument to 
hold. This argument depends only upon the benefits individual 2 receives 
from individual 3*8 increased well-being and upon the benefits individual 
1 receives from the increase in individual 2's utility. Although the 
marginal benefits to individual 2 may be very large, it is possible that 
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his marginal cost of making a transfer to individual 3 is so great that 
he would not undertake such a transfer alone. 
Assume that these same feelings hold. If individual I's knowledge 
of individual 2's benevolent feelings for individual 3 is not enou^ to 
offset his own dislike for individual 3, then individual 1 might reduce 
his transfers to individual 2 when individual 2 transfers goods to 
individual 3. The reason individual 1 mi^t reduce his transfer is that 
individual 2's transfer to individual 3 can cause a reduction in indi­
vidual I's utility. Individual 2's transfer will reduce his own holdings 
of goods and increase individual 3's holdings and utility level. Both of 
these actions will lower individual I's utility level. This transfer 
will increase individual 2's utility level, however, which will increase 
individual I's utility level. The total effect on individual I's utility 
level is indeterminate. If individual I's utility level decreases, he 
will reduce his transfers to individual 2 since that portion of his 
transfer which is retransferred by individual 2 inçoses an additional 
cost on him. 
Finally, consider the situation in which all externalities are 
benevolent. This is basically the situation Hochman and Rodgers [22] 
had in mind when they wrote their article on Fareto optimal redistribu­
tion. They did not seem to consider individual 2's influence on 
individual I's decision of (Aether or how much to transfer to individual 
3. Perhaps they thought this effect was negligible. It is possible in 
this situation for individual 1 to make transfers to both individuals 2 
and 3 and for individual 2 to make a transfer to individual 3. 
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Individual I's transfer to individual 2 will increase the incentive 
individual 2 has for making a transfer to individual 3 since his margin­
al cost for making the transfer will be lowered. Likewise, individual 
2's concern for individual 3's welfare will increase the incentive indi­
vidual 1 has for making a transfer to individual 3. 
Can individual 1 ever be a free rider in this situation? Not if 
he transfers goods to individual 2 and individual 2 transfers goods to 
individual 3. Individual 2 will pass some of these transfers on to 
individual 3. In this case individual 1 will make his transfer to 
individual 3 indirectly, but he will share in the transfers nonetheless. 
If individual 1 does not make a transfer to individual 2 or individual 3, 
then he can be a free rider. 
Individual 2 can be a free rider but any transfers he receives will 
tend to reduce his desire to free ride. As we stated earlier, an 
individual will not be a free rider unless he receives a greater in­
crease in his utility from free riding than he does from making a joint 
transfer. 
Case IV has one major offering. It is that an individual's actions 
can be influenced by the desires of other individuals. An individual 
may be willing to undertake actions he would rather not perform if he 
knows these actions will please some other person. No use of threat or 
force need be made in these instances. Likewise, the individual might 
limit some activity he enjoys because some person he cares for does not 
approve. Both types of influence are forms of social pressure. 
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Case V: Reciprocal interdependencies with 
mituallv exclusive nondonor recipients 
In case V we address the problem of reciprocal interdependencies. We 
We will utilize a four person model in which both donors are potential 
recipients of the other donor. The nondonor recipients are assumed to 
form mutually exclusive sets as in cases I and III. The utility func­
tions of the four individuals are: 
\ Xg, X3; U^. U3), (3.76) 
Ug = Kg, X ;^ U ,^ U )^, (3.77) 
U3=U3(X3), (3.78) 
and 
«4 = "4<V- (3 79) 
The first order conditions for utility maximimm are: 
, au, au au 
"^ "i " au^  aUg ^^ ax]^  a^  ax]^  ^"^ i 
^ " â^âûj 
au, au, au« au, au, au 
au, au, au, au, 
+ + = <3.80) 
, au. au au 
^^ 2 + 1^ 
1 -
au^ aug 
au, au, au, au, au au, au 
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(3.81) 
4*3 = ES; 4=3 = 0' (3.82) 
and 
(3.83) 
The denominator of equations 3.80 and 3.81 is 1 -
instead of 1 as was previously the case since each donor now enters the 
other's utility function. In earlier cases was equal to zero. 
Each donor's marginal benefit from own consuiiq>tion has also changed since 
he must now consider how his own increase or decrease in consumption will 
affect the other donor's utility level. 
There are ten different combinations of malevolent and benevolent 
externalities for case V. We will cover most of these situations rapidly 
since they are fairly similar to situations discussed in cases II through 
IV. The discussion will be more detailed for those cases where each 
donor has some incentive to transfer to the other. 
When all externalities are malevolent, the transfers which might 
occur are those from individual 1 to individual 4 and from individual 2 
to individual 3. These spiteful transfers are made for the purpose of 
lowering the other donor's level of utility and, hence, raising one's 
own. If both donor's make this type of transfer, it is possible that 
they will both end up worse off. Neither would make the transfer unless 
it raised his own utility level. However, the loss in utility each 
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donor experiences from the other's transfer may more than offset the 
Increase he receives from making his own transfer. 
If one donor has benevolent feelings for the nondonor individual 
who enters his utility function and if all other externalities are 
malevolent, then the donor with the benevolent feelings will transfer to 
both of the nondonors if such transfer will increase his utility. He 
will make a transfer to one nondonor because he likes him and to the 
other because it lowers the other potential donor's utility level. 
If each donor dislikes the other but likes the nondonor entering 
his utility function, then each will make a transfer to the proper non­
donor if the externality is strong enough. He will not make a transfer 
to the other nondonor. 
When one donor likes the other and all other externalities are 
malevolent, then the donor with the benevolent externality may make a 
transfer to the other. The donor-recipient may refuse to accept the 
offered transfer, however, since he may be made worse off by accepting. 
The donor-recipient's utility will be increased, if he accepts the 
transfer, by the fact that he will have more goods and the donor will 
have fewer goods. It will be lowered by the donor's increased utility. 
The total effect on the utility level of the donor-recipient is indeter­
minate. If the transfer Increases his utility level, he will accept it. 
If not, he will refuse it. 
The strength of the donor-recipient's malevolent feelings toward 
the donor will determine whether he is the sort vtio would say "I don't 
like him, but if he is going to give money away I'll be the first one 
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in line" or "1 wouldn't accept anything from him; not even if I were 
starving and he offered me the last apple on earth." 
This same situation may find the donor-recipient making a transfer 
to the individual who is disliked by the donor. This transfer may take 
place whether or not the donor-recipient receives a transfer from the 
donor. 
If one donor is purely altruistic and likes both of the other 
individuals entering his utility function and the other donor dislikes 
both individuals entering his utility function, then the first donor 
will try to make transfers to each of the two individuals who enter his 
utility function, given appropriate levels of the externalities. The 
second donor would not make any transfer. As in the previous situation, 
he has the option of refusing the transfer offered him. 
Suppose that one donor, say individual 1, likes individual 2 but 
dislikes individual 3. Suppose also that individual 2 likes individual 
4 and dislikes individual 1. In this situation, individual 1 might offer 
a transfer to individual 2. Individual 2 will accept or refuse the offer 
depending upon whether it would increase or decrease his utility level. 
Individual 1 might also make a transfer to individual 4, but, as in case 
III, he will only offer the transfer if individual 2 is also willing to 
make a transfer to individual 4. Individual 2 might make a malicious 
transfer to individual 3 and a benevolent transfer to individual 4. 
The situation in which all externalities are benevolent except those 
individual 2 has for individual 1 will lead to the same results as in the 
preceding situation with the exceptions that individual 1 might desire to 
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make a transfer to individual 3 and individual 2 would not. These last 
four situations in which one donor, say individual 1, likes individual 2 
but individual 2 does not like individual 1 remind us of a parent who is 
having problems relating to his teenaged child. The child (individual 2) 
never seems to appreciate the sacrifices the parent (individual 1) makes 
for him. As a matter of fact the child will occasionally, and sometimes 
persistently, do things which upset the parent. I.e., he will make a 
transfer to individual 3 when individual 1 dislikes individual 3. 
In the next situation let both donors have benevolent feelings for 
each other but malevolent feelings for the nondonors. Since neither 
donor will make a transfer to a nondonor the situation is essentially the 
same as that presented at the end of the third section of Chapter II. 
If the benevolent externalities are not great enough for either donor to 
make a transfer to the other, then the donors will be in a region of pure 
exchange. In the two good case this will be region 1 of Figure 2.13 
which is reproduced here in a modified form as Figure 3.9. 
If only one donor has externalities strong enough to cause a trans­
fer, then he will offer the other donor all or some of the goods in his 
consumption bundle. If individual 1 is the donor, he will be in region 
2 of Figure 3.9 if he desires to transfer some of each good in his 
consumption bundle. He will be in region 4 or region 6 if he desires to 
transfer only one good in this two good example. Since individual 2's 
benevolent externality is not strong enough to cause him to transfer to 
individual 1 he will accept the transfer offered by individual 1. As he 
accepts more units of the transfer his marginal benefits from the 
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Figure 3.9. Edgeworth box when both donors are benevolent 
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transfer will fall. His marginal costs • 9U^/9X^) 
may rise or fall. Both and ôUj^/ôXj^ will rise as individual 1 
transfers goods to individual 2. However, will fall since the 
transfer makes individual 1 better off. The interaction of these three 
terms may lead to a rise or a fall in individual 2's marginal cost from 
receiving the transfer. The transfer from individual 1 to individual 
2 will stop either when individual I's marginal cost from making the 
transfer is just equal to the marginal benefits he receives or when the 
marginal benefits individual 2 obtains from the receipt of the transfer 
is just equal to the marginal cost he incurs. Either individual may 
stop the transfer. 
Suppose each donor desires to make a transfer to the other. Can 
reciprocal transfers take place? Would one individual be willing to 
accept a transfer from an individual to whom he desired to make a trans­
fer? The answer to these questions is dependent upon the particular 
transfers each donor desires to make. We have reproduced Figure 2.14 
as Figure 3.10. Recall that in this figure each individual's bliss 
point is closer to his own origin than it is to the other individual's 
origin. 
If both donors want to transfer some of each good in their consump­
tion set then the initial allocation would lie in region 1 of Figure 
3.10. As we stated in Chapter II this region is a contract region. All 
allocations within this region are Pareto efficient. Each individual 
would refuse to accept a transfer offered by the other since accepting 
the transfer would move him away from his own bliss point. If the 
Oi F J 
Figure 3.10. EdgeworCh box when both donors are very benevolent 
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custom of his society forbade him from refusing the transfer, he would 
accept it J wait an appropriate amount of time, and make his own transfer 
to the original donor. This process would be repeated by the original 
donor, and then, again, by the original recipient. There would not be 
a stable equilibrium in this society. Transfers would continuously move 
the equilibrium from one individual's bliss point to the other's. 
If the desired transfers are such that one donor wants to make a 
transfer of a subset of the goods bundle and the other donor wants to 
make a transfer of a different subset so that the two transfer bundles 
do not have any goods in common, then the transfers will be made without 
being rejected. In the two good case, this type of transfer will occur 
if the initial allocation is in region 8 or 9 of either Figure 3.9 or 
3.10. In region 8 of either figure, individual 1 desires to transfer 
some of good to individual 2 and individual 2 desires to transfer 
some of good to individual 1. They will continue their transfers, 
which resemble exchanges since each is giving a good to the other, until 
point M is reached. In region 9 each will transfer the other good until 
point L is reached. 
Suppose each donor's transfer bundle contains some goods in common 
with the other donor's transfer bundle. This is the situation that 
occurs in regions 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Figure 3.10. In the two person, 
two good case depicted, one individual wants to transfer some of each 
good and the other wants to transfer some units of one good. The goods 
which are not coianon to both transfer bundles will be transferred with­
out any problems. Whether the goods common to both transfer bundles 
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are transferred and who receives them if they are transferred will 
depend upon the relative persistence and insistence capabilities of the 
two donors. 
In region 4 of Figure 3.10 we have drawn portions of the two 
individuals' indifference curves, and Ig, which contain the initial 
distribution, point N. At point N, individual 1 wants to transfer some 
of both goods while individual 2 wants to transfer some of good X^. 
Individual 1 will transfer enough of good to individual 2 that the 
ridge line IMPQEgK will be reached. The final post-transfer distribu­
tion will lie somewhere along the FQ portion of this ridge line. It's 
exact location will depend upon the bargaining powers of the two 
individuals. 
The last situation we will discuss in case V is one in which all 
externalities are benevolent. Each donor will make a transfer to his 
"own" nondonor recipient if the externalities are strong enough to 
warrant such a transfer. Â donor's transfer to his "own" nondonor 
recipient will have an effect upon the other donor's desire to transfer 
to him. If we assume Individual 1 makes a transfer to individual 3, we 
can look at equation 3.81 to find what effect this transfer will have on 
Individual 2. Letting -dX^ = dX^, dX^ * dX^ = 0, and l/l-BU^/BU^ • 
= A we can rewrite equation 3.81 as 
ôu, âu, au. ôu, au. au 
^^2 - (âû; + âig Eâ; - âs;) - âs;] 4=3' (s-* 
Initially individual l's transfers to individual 3 might increase 
individual 2*8 utility level. Since all of the partial derivatives 
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within the brackets are positive, individual I's transfers will eventu­
ally cause individual 2's utility level to decline. Individual 1 will 
transfer goods to individual 3 until the term in parentheses within the 
brackets is equal to zero. At this point individual 2 is losing utility 
since Is greater than zero. We know that individual I's trans­
fers to individual 3 will cause individual 2's utility to fall over some 
range of the transfer. It may also cause individual 2's utility to 
Increase during the early stages of the transfer. The transfer might 
Increase individual 2's utility level, but then it might also reduce it. 
Even though all externalities are benevolent, it is still possible for 
an individual to be made worse off by a voluntary transfer. 
There Is an example which we have heard reasonably frequently which 
seems to fit this situation. It is of one individual, individual 2, 
telling another, "I like Joe, too, and I realize that he has been having 
problems lately, but you did not have to be so generous." Individuals 
who accuse others of being generous to a fault probably have interdepen­
dent utility functions similar to that possessed by our individual 2. 
Looking back at equation 3.81 we see that individual I's transfer 
to individual 3 will cause and to rise. It will cause 
dU^/dU^ to fall. Thus the marginal benefit individual 2 will receive 
from making a transfer to individual 1 can increase or decrease as a 
result of individual I's transfer. Individual 2*8 marginal cost of 
making a transfer (any transfer) will fall since and 
have not changed and has fallen. The rationale for this decrease 
in the marginal cost is that individual 2's marginal utility from 
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consumption is based upon his own marginal valuation of that consumption 
and upon the marginal effects he feels this consumption has on individual 
1. As individual 1 becomes better off, individual 2 will be less con­
cerned with how his own consumption affects individual 1. 
Individual I's transfer to individual 3 will increase the incentive 
individual 2 has for making a transfer to individual 4 since individual 
I's transfer will lower the marginal costs of making a transfer for 
individual 2. The effect individual I's transfer has on individual 2's 
desire to transfer to individual 1 is not known since we do not know for 
sure how this transfer will affect the marginal benefits individual 2 
would receive from making the transfer to individual 1. 
When all externalities are benevolent the criteria for reciprocal 
transfers between the two donors will be the same as thofe described in 
the previous situation where the donors had benevolent feelings for 
each other but malevolent feelings for the nondonor recipients. 
Case VI: Reciprocal interdependencies with 
joint nondonor recipients 
Case VI is very similar to case V. The only difference is that 
there is now a joint nondonor recipient. The three person model for this 
case is: 
Ui » U^(X^, Xg, X3; Ug, U3), (3.85) 
U2 = U^CX^. X^, X3; U^, U3) (3.86) 
and 
(3.87) 
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The first order conditions for utility mavîTnintig are: 
3u, ÔU, au. au, au, au. 
dU^ = <=1 + (âS, + Sô, ââ,) 
^ • aUg au^ 
au au, au, au, au, au, au, 
+ (âx: + âû: âx: + âû: (&%: + âû: â%:)) = (s-**) 3Xg aug aXg aUg ^axg au^ ax^' 
^ au^ au^ au, au^ au, au, 
au, au, [ 
1 -
, , ,   
^2"—âû;-âû[ (âS; + âûi âx;) *1 + (âx, + âî;) 
au^ aug 
au, au, au, au, au, au au, 
+ (âx; + âi^ â^  + âû[ âï^  âx;^ > x^,] = o, (3.89) 
and 
BD 
dU3= 53^ = 0. (3.90) 
There are again ten combinations of benevolent and malevolent externali­
ties. We will not analyze this case since the results follow directly 
from case V. We will generalize the results, however. 
Reciprocal transfers between the donors will take place under the 
same conditions as those discussed in case V. The donors' transfer 
patterns to the nondonor recipient can be obtained from case V as follows. 
If a donor had some incentive to transfer to both the nondonor recipients 
in case V, then, in case VI, his incentive to transfer to the nondonor 
recipient is essentially the combination of these other incentives. As 
in case IV, the Lindahl curve of this donor is raised from its "original" 
position when the externalities this donor has for the other donor and 
those the other donor has for the nondonor recipient are either both 
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benevolent or both malevolent. "Original" in this instance again means 
the effects caused by the other donor do not enter the analysis. 
If the donor had an incentive to transfer to only one of the two 
nondonor recipients in case V, then he would probably still have an 
incentive to transfer to the nondonor recipient in case VI. In this 
case his Lindahl curve will be lower than his "original" Lindahl curve. 
Finally if the donor did not desire to make a transfer to either non­
donor recipient in case V, then he would have no incentive to make a 
transfer to the nondonor recipient in this case. 
Case VII: Everyone has an interdependent 
utilitv function 
The case in which everyone has an interdependent utility function is 
obviously the general case from which the other, more specific six cases 
have been obtained. The mathematics of the N-person model become 
unwieldly lAen N is greater than three so we will look at the three 
person model. The utility functions of our three individuals are: 
Ui - U^(X^, Xg, X3; Ug, U3), (3.91) 
Ug - Xg, X3; Uj, U3), 2 ^  V  2 '  (3.92) 
and 
U3 - UgCX^, Xg, X3; Ug). (3.93) 
The first order conditions for utility maximums are: 
(3.94) 
where 
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and 
(3.95) 
aug aUg au^ au^ au^ au^ au^ au^ au^ 
• au^ aug ' 
ÔU au, au. au. au. au, au, 
A 5 (1 — " "•' ' — ^ —"' ^ f " "" + ' ' • • \ • •' '^ 
i ^ auj^ aUj'' axj^ au^ auy ax^ 
au. au. au. au, 
* *%ôk * âûj ââT ' (3'**) 
au au au au au. au, au, 
B — (l " 1 ) —— + ( + —' \ 1 
i ^ au^ auy axg ^u^ au^ auy aXg 
au. au au au, 
* ^âô; + ân; âû^) âx; ' "•"> 
ôu au, au au au, au. au, 
c = (1 — T ) —— + ( + ) 1 
i au^ au/ axg ^au^ au^ au/ ax^ 
au, au, au au, 
* "âô;+âig âû^) âx; ' ".98) 
i = 1, 2, 3; i f j f k. 
Each Individual's marginal valuation of his own consumption and of 
the consumption of the other individuals will be influenced by the feel­
ings each individual has for each of the other individuals. Each time 
one individual makes a transfer to another, the marginal valuation of 
each person in the society will change. Each individual will change his 
marginal valuation not only for the goods bundles held by the individuals 
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involved in the transfer but for the goods bundles held by every member 
of the society. 
Thus if individual 1 makes a transfer to individual 2, not only will 
individual I's marginal valuation of his own consumption and of individual 
2's consumption change, but his marginal valuation of individual 3's 
c o n s u m p t i o n  w i l l  a l s o  c h a n g e .  L o o k  a t  e q u a t i o n  3 . 9 8 .  L e t  i  =  1 ,  j  = 2 ,  
and k = 3. The transfer from individual 1 to individual 2 will increase 
individual 2's utility if it is accepted. This increase in individual 
2's utility will cause both and èUg/âUg to fall. Since both 
dU^/dU^ 3^2/9^2 in two of the three terms on the right hand side 
of equation 3.98, the value of must be affected by the transfer. Any 
transfer between any two individuals will affect all the marginal 
valuations of all individuals. 
If there are many individuals in the society, then we would expect 
most of the marginal valuations to be very small. If individual 1 and 
individual 3 were not acquainted with each other, then we would expect 
ôUj^/èX^, , ôU^/ôX^, and most terms involving these four 
terms to be close to zero. 
In our three person example we will assume that each person is well 
acquainted with the other two. Transfers can be motivated by benevolent 
or malevolent feelings as in previous cases. If transfers are motivated 
by benevolent feelings, the donor desires to increase the utility of the 
person receiving the transfer. If transfers are motivated by malevolent 
feelings, then the donor is not as interested in Increasing the utility 
of the recipient as he is in decreasing the utility of some third party. 
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Of course it is possible that a transfer is motivated by both types of 
feelings. The donor wants to Increase the utility of the recipient and 
he also wants to decrease the utility of some third party. 
An individual's desire to make a transfer will be influenced by the 
other members in the society. The individual might make a transfer to 
an individual he dislikes if this transfer either pleases some indi­
viduals he likes very much (or wants to impress) or displeases sane 
individuals he dislikes more than the recipient. In either case, the 
individual is still making the transfer voluntarily. 
Likewise, the individual mi^t not make a transfer that he would 
desire to make in the absence of the nonrecipient individuals if this 
transfer makes some individuals he cares for worse off or if it makes 
some individuals he dislikes better off. 
A new development in this case is that not only can an individual's 
desire to make a transfer be influenced by other individuals, but his 
desire to accept a transfer can also be influenced by other individuals. 
An Individual might reject a transfer if he knows that accepting it will 
make someone he likes worse off. Thus a child might forego a free ice 
cream cone if he knows that it will ruin his appetite and that his 
mother has put a lot of effort into preparing his dinner. The individual 
might also reject a transfer if accepting it increases the utility of 
someone he dislikes. When we hear s one one say, "Of course I want (to 
accept) it, but I want it because I want it, not because Mr. Smith wants 
me to have it," we are hearing him reject a transfer because the transfer 
increases the utility of someone whose utility he does not want increased. 
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Aa Individual mi^t also accept a transfer he does not want because 
this action either increases the utility of someone he likes or reduces 
the utility of someone he dislikes. An example of the first reason mig^t 
be an individual who accepts a gift he knows the giver cannot afford to 
make. He reluctantly accepts the gift because he knows the giver will 
receive an increase in utility from the transfer. An example of the 
second reason might be a girl accepting a date with a boy she does not 
really like in order to make her boyfriend jealous. 
Reciprocal transfers will take place under the conditions outlined 
in case V. These conditions are if each donor wants to transfer goods 
not being transferred by his recipient then the transfers will take 
place. If the transfer bundle of each donor contains some goods in 
common with the transfer bundles of other donors, then those goods which 
are not in common will be transferred. Those goods which are in common 
will not be transferred unless one donor is very persistent or the other 
very weak-willed. When every transfer bundle contains the same goods, 
no one will accept the offered bundle since it would make him worse off. 
The Formation of Charitable Organizations 
When one individual makes a voluntary transfer to another it may be 
said that he is making a charitable contribution to the recipient. When 
two or more individuals join forces to make a joint transfer to one 
recipient, then they have effectively formed a charitable organization. 
The organization may be formally organized and have an effective life of 
several decades such as the Red Cross or the American Cancer Society, or 
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it may be informal and have an effective life of only a few hours such 
as the "Let's give Shorty, our janitor, a Christmas present" society. 
The recipient of the charitable organization's transfers may be one 
individual, such as Shorty, or it may be an entire class of individuals 
such as the blind, cancer victims, or the Indigent. The common thread 
in all charitable organizations is that each member of the organization 
makes a contribution to the total transfer. 
We discussed an individual's desire to make a joint transfer in 
some detail in case 11 of the preceding section of this chapter. The 
conclusions of that case were basically that an individual would join in 
making a joint transfer if that gave him a higher level of utility than 
he obtained by being a free rider. We also noted that the smaller an 
individual's share of the total transfer the more likely he is to join 
in making that transfer. This generalization does not hold in all 
cases, of course, for some individuals will never willingly join in a 
transfer no matter how small their share. 
If the recipient of the transfer is one individual or a group whose 
members do not change, then we may treat the recipient as we did indi­
vidual 3 in case IV of the preceding section. That is, the individual 
who is the object of the transfer is the one who receives the transfer. 
We assume that this recipient keeps and consumes the goods transferred 
to him. 
If the individuals who are the object of the transfer belong to a 
group whose members are constantly changing or personally unacquainted 
with the potential donors, then the potential donors might make their 
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transfers to an intermediary which claims to have some knowledge of who 
the desired transfer recipients are. These transfers to the intermedi­
ary are made because they reduce the information costs to the donors. 
This situation is similar to case III of the preceding section. The 
donor of the transfer corresponds to individual 1 in this case; the 
intermediary, to individual 2; and the final recipient, to individual 4. 
In this case the intermediary can be one individual such as Reverend 
Weems, the pastor of the donor's church, or an organization such as the 
American Foundation for the Blind. The final recipient can be one 
Individual such as the poorest individual in Reverend Weems' parish or 
it could be a group of individuals such as all blind people. We will 
look at this situation in more detail. 
Let us rewrite equation 3.62. 
This is individual I's first order condition for a utility maximization 
from case III. Strictly speaking, if individual 1 desires to make a 
transfer to a certain class of individuals then this class of individuals 
should enter his utility function. If we assume that he is ignorant of 
exactly who the members of this class are and that individual 2, the 
intermediary, knows their identities, then we can assume that only 
individual 2 enters directly in individual I's utility function. We 
must realize now, however, that when Individual 1 makes a transfer to 
162 
Individual 2 his purpose is not to make individual 2 better off but to 
give individual 2 the means of making transfers to individual 4. 
Ideally, individual 1 would prefer that individual 2 pass all of 
the transfer on to the final recipient(s). As we have seen, however, 
individual 2 will pass on only enough of the transfer to equate his 
marginal cost of the transfer with hiii marginal benefit. Individual 2 
will almost always keep a portion of individual I's transfer for himself. 
That portion of the transfer retained by the intermediary has been called 
fees, administrative costs, fund raising costs, profit, and graft [31]. 
When the donor realizes what portion of his transfer is retained by the 
intermediary, his transfers will be of a size that maximizes his utility. 
When the donor does not realize that the intermediary is retaining a 
portion of his transfer, or does not know lAat portion is being retained, 
then he will make the wrong size transfer. If he underestimates the 
Intermediary's "cut," his transfers will be too large [31]. He should 
reduce his transfers in order to maximize his utility. 
Current tax policy in the United States is designed to increase the 
incentive individuals have for making charitable contributions to cer­
tain charitable intermediaries or charity recipients by giving these 
intermediaries and recipients a tax deductible status. This tax deduct­
ible status means any charitable contribution an individual makes to one 
of these intermediaries or recipients may be subtracted from his income 
before his taxes are determined. He will pay taxes on a smaller income 
and the marginal tax rate he faces may be smaller as a result. Since 
all charitable intermediaries and reeipiants do not have the tax 
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deductible status, the government is able to increase the incentive an 
individual has of making a transfer to an intermediary or recipient with 
the tax deductible status by effectively making a joint transfer with 
this individual. 
Current federal income tax policy increases the incentive of all 
taxpayers to make charitable contributions, but it generally increases 
the incentive of individuals in hi^ tax brackets more than the incen­
tive of Individuals in low tax brackets. We would usually expect 
individuals with higher incomes to make more transfers than individuals 
with lower incomes since we would expect their marginal utility from 
own consumption to be lower. If the marginal utility of own consumption 
falls after the basic necessities of life have been obtained, then the 
marginal cost of making a transfer will also fall. Even if we assume 
that the marginal cost of making a transfer is lower for a high income 
individual than for a lew income individual, we will not always observe 
higher income individuals making larger transfers. The decision to make 
transfers is based upon the marginal benefits the transfer produces as 
well as the marginal costs. 
We will use a simple example to show that the current tax policy 
induces larger transfers from hig^ income individuals than from low 
income individuals. Suppose that there are two individuals. Individual 
1 has an income of $12,000 a year and individual 2 has an income of 
$50,000 per year. Suppose an individual can contribute up to fifty per­
cent of his income to a charitable cause before he has to pay taxes on 
those charitable contributions. An individual's income tax is based on 
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his Income after deductions for charitable contributions. We will 
assume that both of our individuals contribute fifty percent of their 
income to charitable causes. 
If the average tax rate on a $12,000 income is twenty percent, our 
first individual would owe $2400 in taxes if he did not make any 
charitable contributions. We assume that he transfers $6,000 to some 
worthy cause so he need pay taxes on only $6,000. Assume the average 
tax rate on $6,000 is fifteen percent. Then the first individual owes 
$900 in taxes. CXir first individual has made a transfer of $6,000 but 
the transfer cost him only $4500. The other $1,500 came from the 
reduction in his income taxes. If our donor had to finance the entire 
transfer, to say individual 3, himself, he would have made a transfer 
such that 
where we have assumed away the interaction effects of other individuals. 
When the government shares in his transfer he will be willing to trans­
fer until 
where dX^ = - dX^ - S and S is the amount paid by the government via 
reduced taxes to individual 1. The maximum share of individual I's 
transfer the government will pay is one-fourth. This will occur when 
the total transfer is $6,000. 
(3.99) 
auj, 0U3 dXg 
(3.100) 
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If the average tax rate on $50,000 is fifty percent individual 2 
would owe $25,000 in taxes if he made no deductions. After a $25,000 
contribution he would owe taxes on $25,000. With an average tax rate 
of forty percent the individual would owe $10,000 in taxes. If he made 
a charitable transfer of $25,000 the cost to individual 2 would be 
$10,000. The government would finance the other $15,000 via its reduced 
tax receipts from individual 2. In this case the government would be 
willing to pay up to sixty percent of individual 2's transfer costs. 
In general, the higher an individual's income the larger the govern­
ment's share of aiqr transfer he makes. The precise size of the govern­
ment's share of a transfer will be determined by the individual's income, 
the average and marginal tax schedules, the nwyimim, deduction allowed 
for charitable contributions and the amount actually transferred by the 
individual. Feldsteln [16; 17] has determined that size of an indi­
vidual's charitable contribution will increase as his Income increases. 
Another reason an individual might contribute to a charitable 
organization with a tax deductible status is that he may not like the 
way the government is using his tax dollars. When he makes a charitable 
contribution, not only is the government subsidizing his transfer but, 
perhaps more importantly, he is able, within limits, to direct how his 
money is to be used. These limits are fairly iiq>ortant. We showed 
earlier that lAen an individual makes a transfer to an intermediary he 
is effectively telling the intermediary to do what he wants with the 
money or goods. When he makes only a small transfer to the intermediary 
he will probably have little say in how the intermediary allocates his 
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transfer. If he makes a large transfer, he may have much to say. The 
board members of charitable organizations are more likely to be 
individuals lAo have made large donations than individuals who have 
made small donations [10, p. 12]. 
In summary, an individual's desire to make a transfer is based on 
the marginal costs and benefits that transfer yields. The individual 
will make a transfer when the marginal benefits are greater than the 
marginal costs. If more than one individual desires to make a transfer 
to some particular recipient, they will all join in making the transfer 
unless some individuals receive more utility from letting the other 
individuals make the entire transfer. The individuals who do not con­
tribute to the joint transfer are called free riders. Occasionally an 
individual cannot make a direct transfer to individuals he desires to 
help because he is either ignorant of their identities or ignorant of 
how they might best be helped. In these cases he might make a transfer 
to an intermediary who is not shackled by such information constraints. 
Once he makes the transfer to the intermediary the transferor usually 
gives up effective control of his transfer. Finally, the government can 
influence the Individual's incentive to make transfers by altering its 
tax policy toward charitable contributions. 
167 
CHAPTEit IV. SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Our purpose in writing this dissertation was to show that eleemosy­
nary or charitable behavior is an economically rational and justifiable 
action undertaken by individuals in order to improve their own well-
being. We desired to show what conditions would cause an individual to 
make voluntary transfers and how these conditions would be affected under 
varying assumptions concerning potential recipients and other potential 
donors. In the first chapter we listed twelve reasons why one individual 
might seem to voluntarily transfer resources to another individual. From 
this list we selected the interdependent utility function as the most 
promising vehicle for economic analysis. 
In Chapter II we reviewed the commonly accepted theory of the 
consumer. In this theory, the consumer is assumed to have a strictly 
private utility function so that his utility is a function of the goods 
and services which he himself consumes. The consumption and welfare 
levels of other individuals do not enter his utility function. Each of 
these consumers is economically selfish. An economically selfish 
individual will never voluntarily make a transfer to another individual 
since the transfer will lower his holdings of goods. If the individual 
has fewer goods to consume, his utility level will fall. 
When the assumption that all consumers have strictly private utility 
functions is relaxed, the possibility of voluntary transfers is intro­
duced. With an interdependent utility function, an individual receives 
utility from the consumption and welfare levels of other individuals as 
well as from his own consumption. If an individual has benevolent 
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feelings for some individuals who enter his utility function, then 
increases in their consumption and welfare levels will increase his own 
utility level. His utility level will fall with increases in the con­
sumption and welfare levels of the individuals he dislikes. The 
individual will make a transfer whenever the marginal benefits of the 
transfer are greater than the marginal costs. Transfers are generally 
motivated by the transferor's benevolent feelings for the recipient. 
Occasionally an individual may make a transfer whose primary purpose is 
not to increase the utility of the recipient but rather to reduce the 
utility level of some third party who dislikes the recipient and who is 
disliked by the transferor. 
The fact that an individual is willing to make voluntary transfers 
indicates that his indifference surfaces are not strictly convex to his 
origin. If his benevolence is strong enough, his indifference surfaces 
will be hyper-ellipsoids. (We assumed these indifference surfaces were 
circles in the two good case.) When this occurs, the individual's con­
sumption set will contain a bliss point. The existence of a bliss point 
indicates that there is some distribution of goods which will maximize 
this individual's utility. The location of an individual's bliss point 
will be dependent upon the supplies of all goods available for consump­
tion and his feelings for each of the individuals who enter his utility 
function. 
If there is a bliss point for an individual, then there will be a 
region of charity and several regions of possible charity for that 
individual. If a distribution of goods places the individual in his 
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region of charity, then that individual will be willing to transfer some 
amount of each good he possesses. If the distribution places him in a 
region of possible charity, he will be willing to transfer portions of 
some, but not all, of the goods he possesses. 
The transfers an individual makes will generally not lead to the 
Pareto efficient locus unless the donor is originally in his region of 
charity. Post-transfer exchange will usually be necessary to reach the 
Pareto efficient locus. 
When there are more than two individuals in the society, the post-
transfer exchanges may lead to situations where further transfers are 
desired by some individuals. When some of the externalities caused by 
interdependencies are malevolent, the Pareto efficient region for society 
will expand. A transfer between two individuals will be a Pareto better 
move for those two individuals, but it will not be a Pareto better move 
for society if some third individual is made worse off by the transfer. 
The Pareto efficient region can also expand if two individuals have very 
strong benevolent feelings for each other. Neither will accept a trans­
fer from the other since his utility will only be increased when the 
other accepts a transfer from him. The expansion of society's Pareto 
efficient region means the Pareto criterion will be a less powerful tool 
in determining which transfers or exchanges are in society's best 
interest. 
When more than one individual enters benevolently into an individ­
ual's utility function, that individual will base the order of his trans­
fers on the size of the externality he experiences from each of the other 
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Individuals. He will make his first transfer to the individual who 
imposes the largest externality. When the externalities imposed by two 
or more individuals have the same highest value, he will divide his 
transfer among these individuals. The transferor will continue to make 
transfers until the marginal benefits of the transfer are equal to the 
marginal costs. 
The transferor need not make transfers to the poorest individuals 
in his society. These individuals do not necessarily have to enter his 
utility function. Even if they do enter his utility function, we must 
remember that the decision to transfer is based in part on the marginal 
benefits the donor receives from making the transfer. Wealth and income 
levels will be only two of the many factors which determine these margin­
al benefits. It should not surprise us if an individual makes a transfer 
to a reasonably wealthy individual, perhaps to one even wealthier than 
himself, while he ignores the plight of the impoverished. The individual 
is simply making transfers which maximize his own welfare. 
When two or more individuals want to make a transfer to the same 
recipient, then there may be an incentive for some of these potential 
transferors to become free riders. Since we have assumed that all 
individuals are utility maximizers, an individual will only become a 
free rider if free riding gives him a greater level of utility than con­
tributing to a joint transfer. Generally, the smaller an Individual's 
share in a joint transfer scheme the greater the incentive for him to 
contribute to the transfer. Sometimes a donor will refuse to contribute 
to a joint transfer, not because he does not have benevolent feelings for 
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the recipient, but because he feels that the size of the transfer 
favored by the other transferors is too large. When two or more trans­
ferors decide to jointly administer a transfer to a single (class of) 
recipient(s), they are, in effect, forming a charitable organization. 
It is the transferors' concern for the welfare of a common recipient 
that makes the formation of charitable organizations possible. 
When other individuals with interdependent utility functions enter 
an individual's utility function, then the feelings of these other 
individuals will affect the desire of the individual to make or receive 
transfers. For example, the individual might make a transfer he would 
not otherwise have made if he knows that making this transfer will please 
some individual other than the recipient. The feelings of the other 
individuals are a form of social pressure. However, this type of social 
pressure does not threaten the individual with an externally imposed loss 
of utility if he does not fulfill the desires of the other individuals. 
When two individuals enter each other's utility functions, they may 
desire to make transfers to each other. As long as the transfer bundles 
contain no goods in common, the transfers will be made given that each is 
willing to accept the other's transfer. When there are goods in common, 
the noncommon goods will be transferred. The common goods will only be 
transferred if one transferor is very insistent, and then only in conjunc­
tion with a transfer desired by the other donor. 
We have given an economic rationale for the general eleemosynary 
behavior of individuals. There are many specific areas of eleemosynary 
behavior which can be studied in depth using the interdependent utility 
172 
function. One of these specific areas concerns intra-family transfers. 
Standard expositions of consumer theory assume that it applies equally to 
a single individual and to a single family unit. These expositions 
internalize the intra-family externalities and assume away any problems 
concerning the intra-family distribution of goods. The interdependent 
utility function can be used to help explain family behavior, especially 
the behavior concerning the distribution of goods within the family. 
Another potential use of the interdependent utility function is in 
the area of bequests. It can help explain why an individual would take 
out an insurance policy on his life and \Aiy he would leave his posses­
sions to some relatives and friends but not to others. 
Â third use for the interdependent utility function is in analyzing 
redistribution through the public sector. The governmental welfare 
function can be viewed as a function of the utility functions of all 
individuals under its jurisdiction. The utility functions of the top 
officials in a government agency will probably carry the most wei^t in 
that agency's welfare function, however. 
Finally the interdependent utility function can have an impact on 
general equilibrium theory. We have utilized the interdependent utility 
function to study the transfers made by one individual to another. We 
did note that when an individual is in a region of possible charity he 
will prefer to engage in exchange with the desired recipient by trading 
those goods having relevant externalities for other goods. He will be 
willing to exchange the goods at terms of trade more favorable than the 
recipient can otherwise find on the market. This means that all 
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individuals need not face the same set of relative prices. General 
equilibrium theory should be extended or reformulated to accommodate 
this result. 
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